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RE-EVALUATING LARGE MULTIPLE-DEFENDANT
CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS
Paul Marcus*
I. INTRODUCTION
Americans have decided to get tough on crime.' This decision applies not
simply to violent crime, but to white-collar crime as well. In particular, we have
seen substantial prosecutorial resources directed against a wide range of criminal
endeavors conducted by groups of defendants, especially in the area of white-collar
prosecutions.2 In support of this movement, one finds the large multiple-defendant
criminal trial becoming widespread3 and commonplace.' Yet, as the practice has
* Haynes Professor of Law, College of William and Mary. I appreciate the thoughtful
and helpful comments received during presentations to law faculty workshops at Rutgers
University-Newark, the University of Illinois, Valparaiso University and the College of
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Sandy Guerra, Ed Imwinkelried, Tony Pagone, and John Tucker. Much of the drafting of this
Article took place during a research leave spent in Australia. I extend my deep appreciation
to the College of William and Mary for granting the leave and to the University of
Melbourne, Centre for Comparative Constitutional Law for extending warm hospitality.
On this point, surely there can be little disagreement. For evidence of this attitude, see
infra note 11 and text accompanying notes 11-21.
2 William J. Stuntz, Race, Class, and Drugs, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1795, 1839 (1998).
3 Several times in the past, I have explored questions involving multiple-defendant trials
and the law of criminal conspiracy. I have twice before considered such issues from an
empirical view looking to the manner in which such prosecutions are brought forward and
the difficulties - real or potential - which are created. See Paul Marcus, Conspiracy: The
Criminal Agreement in Theory and in Practice, 65 GEo. L.J. 925 (1977); Paul Marcus,
Criminal Conspiracy Law: Time to Turn Back From an Ever Expanding, Ever More
Troubling Area, I WM. & MARY BILL RTs. J. 1 (1992). Here, however, the focus is less on
broadly identifying such difficulties and more on attempting to craft solutions to two acute
problems. See discussion infra Part III.
' Not all agree. Note the comments ofthen-Assistant United States Attorney (later F.B.I.
Director) Louis Freeh at the Annual Judicial Conference of the Second Judicial Circuit of the
United States. Annual Judicial Conference of the Second Judicial Circuit of the United
States, Panel Presentation: The Problems in the Trial of "Monster "RICO Cases, 125 F.R.D.
197, 234, 236-42 (1988) [hereinafter "Monster" RICO Cases] (remarks of Louis Freeh,
Assistant United States Attorney). But see the remarks ofthe Honorable J. Joseph Smith forty
years ago identifying the problem of "long, involved criminal trials." Judicial Conference of
the Second Judicial Circuit of the United States, The Problems of Long Criminal Trials: A
Panel Discussion, 34 F.R.D. 155, 157-58 (1963) [hereinafter Long Criminal Trials]
(remarks of Judge J. Joseph Smith); see also Fed. Bar Council Comm. on Second Circuit
Courts, A Proposal Concerning Problems Created by Extremely Long Criminal Trials, 128
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become more entrenched at both the local and national levels, criticism of such an
approach has been muted. For instance, questions about the necessity for - and
wisdom of - the wide use of the conspiracy charge5 have all but disappeared,
replaced with a heavy reliance on the perceived dangers of group criminal activity.6
Additionally, one almost never hears today the earlier cries against the RICO
offense which claimed that the statute is too broad in application and too vague in
definition.7 RICO has become an accepted part of the law enforcement arsenal in
the battle against group crime.'
In practice, these issues have become settled. Nevertheless, the conclusion of
F.R.D. 137, 138 (1989) [hereinafter Fed. Bar Council Comm.] (writing of "the current
prevalence of mega-trials"). See generally Edward J. lmwinkelried, Prejudice to the Nth
Degree. The Introduction of Uncharged Misconduct Admissible Only Against a Co-
defendant at a Megatrial, 53 OKLA. L. REV. 35 (2000) (discussing the phenomenon and
complexity of large multiple-defendant joint trials).
5 See Phillip E. Johnson, The Unnecessary Crime of Conspiracy, 61 CAL. L. REV. 1137,
1138-41 (1973).
6 See generally United States v. Townsend, 924 F.2d 1385, 1394 (7th Cir. 1991)
(suggesting that group action generally is more dangerous than individual activity); United
States v. Stevens, 909 F.2d 431, 433 (11 th Cir. 1990) (noting that an agreement between
persons poses a higher societal threat than individual action). As stated in Callanan v. United
States, 364 U.S. 587 (1961):
[C]ollective criminal agreement - partnership in crime - presents a greater
potential threat to the public than individual delicts. Concerted action both
increases the likelihood that the criminal object will be successfully attained and
decreases the probability that the individuals involved will depart from their path
of criminality. Group association for criminal purposes often, if not normally,
makes possible the attainment of ends more complex than those which one
criminal could accomplish. Nor is the danger of a conspiratorial group limited
to the particular end toward which it has embarked. Combination in crime makes
more likely the commission ofcrimes unrelated to the original purpose for which
the group was formed. In sum, the danger which a conspiracy generates is not
confined to the substantive offense which is the immediate aim of the enterprise.
Id. at 593-94. The Supreme Court has never retreated from this position. Some trial judges
even instruct on the point. See United States v. Lopez, 937 F.2d 716, 725 (2d Cir. 1991).
However, this view of group danger has been strongly challenged. See Professor Abraham
S. Goldstein, Conspiracy to Defraud the United States, 68 YALE L.J. 405, 414 (1959).
7 See, e.g., Barry Tarlow, RICO: The New Darling of the Prosecutor's Nursery, 49
FORDHAM L. REV. 165, 169-70 (1980).
8 For discussion of RICO impact, see Craig M. Bradley, Racketeers, Congress, and the
Courts: An Analysis of RICO, 65 IOWA L. REV. 837, 837-38, 845 (1980); Symposium, Law
and the Continuing Enterprise: Perspectives on RICO, 65 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 873 (1990);
Gerard E. Lynch, RICO: The Crime of Being a Criminal (pts. 1-2), 87 COLUM. L. REV. 661,
920 (1987); Symposium, Reforming RICO: If Why, and How?, 43 VAND. L. REV. 621
(1990); Barry Tarlow, RICO Revisited, 17 GA. L. REV. 291 (1983); Symposium, 20th
Anniversary of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (1970-1980), 64
ST. JoHN's L. REV. 701 (1990).
[Vol. 11:67
MULTIPLE-DEFENDANT CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS
that portion of the debate is hardly the end of the discussion as to issues concerning
the process of multiple-defendant cases.9 Increasingly, questions are being raised
as to the procedures used in connection with such prosecutions. It may now be
beyond dispute that we are willing to give law enforcement officials great weapons
in the investigation and prosecution of group criminal behavior. It is not at all clear,
however, that the manner in which we prosecute such defendants is above debate
and critique. 0 After all, while Americans apparently have chosen to punish with
severity those convicted of group crime, that does not mean that - consistent with
constitutional mandates - those charged with such crimes can be processed with
anything less than the full complement of procedural and constitutional guarantees.
In this Article, I will look to the way those charged with crimes involving group
criminal behavior are prosecuted. Concerns will be raised in two key areas: (1)
Have we extended too much power to state and federal prosecutors in determining
where to bring such individuals to trial?; and (2) Should the courts scrutinize far
more carefully the joining together of these defendants for trial?
9 The most remarkable aspect of the multiple-defendant process is, surely, the somewhat
bizarre "slight evidence" rule. Some courts (the Eighth Circuit is the leader) write that
"[o]nce a conspiracy has been established, only slight evidence is needed to link a defendant
to the conspiracy." United States v. Davidson, 195 F.3d 402, 406 (8th Cir. 1999) (quoting
United States v. Pena, 67 F.3d 153, 155 (8th Cir. 1995)). See generally United States v.
Causor-Serrato, 234 F.3d 384, 388 (8th Cir. 2000) (requiring only slight evidence to link
defendant to conspiracy), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 1072 (2001); United States v. Jolivet, 224
F.3d 902,909 (8th Cir. 2000) (holding defendant's knowledge was enough evidence to link
him to conspiracy). While such statements have a certain ring of authenticity to them, they
are, alas, quite incorrect and assuredly unconstitutional. To convict an individual of
conspiracy, the evidence must establish beyond a reasonable doubt that person's intent to
pursue crime and her knowing membership in the criminal group. Nothing less will suffice,
as even the Eighth Circuit recognizes. See United States v. Jiminez-Perez, 238 F.3d 970, 973
(8th Cir. 2001) (holding that slight evidence must still meet reasonable doubt standard). Most
courts today resist the lure of the "slight evidence" rule and have "banished" the concept.
United States v. Majors, 196 F.3d 1206, 1211 n.8 (11 th Cir. 1999). These courts have
explained that "the Constitution requires substantial evidence to support any criminal
conviction." United States v. Adkinson, 158 F.3d 1147, 1152 n.10 (11 th Cir. 1998). Some
have redefined the rule so that a conviction is valid if evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt,
shows "the connection of a defendant to a conspiracy [even if that connection is] only...
slight." State v. Olea, 678 P.2d 465, 478 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1983). For a critical view of this
area, see Brent E. Newton, The Antiquated "Slight Evidence Rule" in Federal Conspiracy
Cases, 1 J. App. PRAc. & PROCESs 49 (1999).
"0 See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
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II. THE BASIC APPROACH
A. The Harshness of It
Punishment for joint criminal activity is tough in the United States both as to
responsibility for the crimes of others and as to sanction."1 Whereas serious
questions have been proffered in the past as to such punishment, we see little such
" Actually, by virtually every measure and for any crime, punishment today is extremely
harsh in the United States. This is true if measured against prior years or if evaluated against
that which is found elsewhere in the world. On the former point, see BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'TOF JUSTICE, PRISON ANDJAILINMATES, 1995, PUB. No. NCJ- 161132,
at 2 (1996) (reporting prison population as having more then doubled between 1985 and
1995), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/pji95.pdf; BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'TOF JUSTICE, PROBATION ANDPAROLE POPULATION REACHES ALMOST
3.8 MILLION, PUB. No. NCJ- 161722, at 1-2 (1996) (noting that the number of individuals in
prison or on probation or parole more than tripled since 1980), available at
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/pap95.pdf; see also Paul Butler, Retribution, for
Liberals, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1873, 1881 n.31 (1999) (."The population of Americans
incarcerated on any given day would qualify as the sixth-largest city in the country and is
equal to the total combined populations of Seattle, Cleveland, and Denver."') (quoting THE
REAL WAR ON CRIME: THE REPORT OF THE NATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE COMMISSION 33
(Steven R. Donziger ed., 1996)). In recent years especially, the increase has been dramatic.
"About 2 million Americans are in jails and prisons, and another 5 to 6 million are on
probation or parole. These incarceration rates are rising much faster than the population."
Michael E. Tigar, The Vicious Prison Cycle, NAT'LL.J., Aug. 21, 2000, at A20. As noted in
Greg Krikorian, Federal and State Prison Populations Soared Under Clinton, Report Finds,
L.A. TIMES, Feb. 19,200 1, at A3, "[diuring (President] Clinton's tenure, the total population
of federal and state prisons combined rose by 673,000 inmates."
The numbers are even more striking when placed in worldwide context. For instance,
in comparison with the population of the United Kingdom, the rates in the U.S. are
dramatically higher. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CRIME XND
JUSTICE IN THE UNITED STATES AND IN ENGLAND AND WALES, 1981-96, PUB. No. NCJ-
169284, at 25 (1998), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/cjusew96.pdf.
"Over the past twenty-five years, the United States has built the largest prison system in the
world." ELLIOTT CURRIE, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA 3 (1998). "'Compared to
other countries, [the U.S. rate of incarceration] is by far the highest rate of incarceration
relative to population in the Western world."' Butler, supra at 1881 n.31 (quoting THEREAL
WAR ON CRIME, supra at 33) (alteration in original). "Since about 1973, the prison
population has steadily soared from approximately 325,000 prisoners to nearly 2 milLion
today - a sixfold increase, which has made the United States the world's largest per capital
jailer of its population." Peter Elikann, Do More Jails EqualLess Crime?, NAT'L L.J., Sept.
25, 2000, at A20. "In the United States, more than 550 out of every 100,000 people are in
jail. In Canada, the rate is 116 per 100,000; in France, it is 84 per 100,000." Tigar, supra.
The U.S. view continues as reflected in the most recent proposals from the Federal
Sentencing Commission. See Carrie Johnson, Panel Boosts Penalties for White-Collar
Offenses, WASH. POST, Jan. 9, 2003, at El.
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public debate today. Three illustrations make this point.
With an illegal scheme, the defendant may be convicted in most jurisdictions
of both conspiracy and the contemplated crime. The two generally do not merge,
and the act of agreement (i.e., the conspiracy) can be the basis of responsibility for
the substantive crime.12 Because the two offenses are seen as distinct - the
agreement constituting conspiracy 3 and the execution of the agreed upon crime
the defendant may also receive consecutive sentences for them. While in practice 4
consecutive sentencing would not be the usual rule for one set of activities," the
principle is well established and followed in most places in the United States.' 6
The great punishment forjoint criminal activities can also be seen with the wide
use of criminal forfeitures in connection with such cases.' 7 RICO allows for the
forfeiture of "any proceeds which the person obtained, directly or indirectly, from
racketeering activity."'" Though there may be considerable disagreement on the
identification and measurement of forfeitable assets from group activities, 9 there
can be little doubt that the loss of property often combines with the more traditional
criminal penalties to punish severely those convicted ofj oint criminal acts.2"
Perhaps the strongest evidence of the tough punishment seen for joint criminal
activity can be found in the influential - and broadly copied - Federal Sentencing
Guidelines. Conspiracy and RICO defendants will face harsh penalties based on the
12 Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640 (1946).
'3 A similar notion is found with the RICO offense, which has at its core the enterprise,
as opposed to any predicate acts committed. Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations
Act, Pub. L. 91-452, § 904(a), 84 Stat. 947 (1978) (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968
(2000)).
14 See supra note 3.
'" The conspiracy and the contemplated crime, the RICO enterprise and the predicate
offense.
6 Indeed, the Supreme Court has written that, in addition to consecutive sentences, the
defendant can - strangely enough - receive greater punishment for the inchoate offense
of conspiracy than for the completed offense, the object of that conspiracy. Iannelli v. United
States, 420 U.S. 770, 778 (1975).
7 JIMMY GURULE & SANDRA GUERRA, THE LAW OF AssET FORFEITURE (1998) is an
excellent book which thoroughly analyzes this area.
18 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a)(3) (2000).
'9 Identifying such property is a difficult task, for judges must trace revenue, profits, and
costs in deciding which property should be given up to the government. See United States v.
$10,700.00 in U.S. Currency, 258 F.3d 215 (3d Cir. 2001); United States v. Martinez, 228
F.3d 587, 590 (5th Cir. 2000); United States v. Simmons, 154 F.3d 765, 770-71 (8th Cir.
1998); United States v. Najjar, 57 F. Supp. 2d 205, 207 (D. Md. 1999).
20 To be sure, the practice is spreading well beyond our national borders. Federal
prosecutors strongly advance the argument that the government ought to "press in bilateral
and multilateral forums for international commitments to institute asset forfeiture regimes to
undercut the profit motive in international crime." THE WHITE HOUSE, INTERNATIONAL
CRIME CONTROLSTRATEGY 11 (1998).
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transactions of others within the scope of the plan or enterprise."'
B. The Trial and Appeal Process
Some of the more troubling problems encountered by criminal defendants in
this area are those that have been resolved and relate to the substance of the
offenses and the appropriate defenses. As to theprocess of adjudication, there can
be little doubt: defendants in multi-party criminal actions have little room for
mistake. With no automatic right of severance,22 those defendants linked to a
criminal scheme usually are tried together. Securing a severance will be difficult.
This is true in most cases, even with the extreme situation in which defendants offer
defenses which apparently are contradictory.24 Whether for conspiracy or for
RICO, each defendant may be joined with others even without an extensive
knowledge of the broad endeavor, so long as the basic plan is known to all."
Jurisdictional restrictions may not even protect such a defendant, since such joinder
can take place in a city far from the particular defendant.2 6
The standard of review in multi-defendant prosecutions is not high. The
evidence does not have to exclude every reasonable theory or hypothesis of
innocence. 7 All factual questions in the record will be construed to support the
government's case.2" The evidence is to be considered "in the light most favorable
to the guilty verdict." 9 The burden for the defense is formidable. As the Supreme
21 See, e.g., United States v. Downing, 297 F. 3d 52, 60 (2d Cir. 2002); United States v.
Vaziri, 164 F.3d 556, 568 (10th Cir. 1999); United States v. Roach, 164 F.3d 403, 413 (8th
Cir. 1998).
22 As in FED. R. CRIM. P. 14. The standard in the states, too, normally is tied to an
exercise of discretion by the trial judge. See infra notes 113-15 and accompanying text.
23 See supra note 3.
24 "[I]t will be the rare case, if ever, where a district court should sever the trial of alleged
coconspirators." United States v. Frazier, 280 F.3d 835, 844 (8th Cir. 2002); see United
States v. Davis, 154 F.3d 772, 781 (8th Cir. 1998); see also infra text accompanying notes
105-07.
5 The government need only prove "knowledge of the essential elements" of the plan.
United States v. Hickman, 151 F.3d 446, 454 (5th Cir. 1998). "[A] defendant may be found
guilty . . . without knowing the full extent of the enterprise or the identities of all the
coconspirators." United States v. Ortiz de Jesus, 230 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 2000). And, of
course, the elements of the offenses can be shown by circumstantial evidence. United States
v. Gore, 154 F.3d 34, 40 (2d Cir. 1998). As for the key element of agreement, the
government need only show, by circumstantial evidence, "a tacit understanding." See United
States v. Samaria, 239 F.3d 228, 234 (2d Cir. 2001) (quoting Thomas v. Roach, 165 F.3d
137, 146 (2d Cir. 1999); United States v. Peterson, 223 F.3d 756, 760 (8th Cir. 2000).
26 See infra text accompanying notes 54-64.
27 Hickman, 151 F.3d at 454.
28 United States v. Nichols, 151 F.3d 850, 851 (8th Cir. 1998).
29 Id. The court on appeal is "highly deferential" to the verdict. United States v. Green,
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Court has written repeatedly, the guilty verdict must stand if "any rational trier of
fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable
doubt." Or, as stated by many courts, a defendant who challenges the sufficiency
of evidence bears "a nearly insurmountable burden."3
HI. CHANGES TO BE MADE
Much has been settled regarding the prosecution of cases with multiple
defendants. As indicated above, several important aspects of the substantive law
for conspiracy and RICO are now clear. In regard to punishment, the People
seemingly have spoken: frequent - and longer - imprisonment is better.
These decisions all reflect a notion that defendants, if proven guilty, deserve to
be treated toughly. The decisions do not, however, suppose that the process by
which we determine responsibility has somehow been altered. Fairness in the
investigatory, pre-trial, and trial stages must be maintained. The burden remains on
the government to prove each element of every offense beyond a reasonable doubt.32
Moreover, criminality must be decided on an individual basis, even as to multiple
defendants. 3
As one considers multi-defendant prosecutions, deep concerns surface as to
whether fairness and due process are being maintained, particularly in two
significant areas. Defense counsel have raised many serious problems in connection
258 F.3d 683, 695 (7th Cir. 2001).
30 Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979).
3' United States v. Viezca, 265 F.3d 593, 597 (7th Cir. 2001) (quoting United States v.
Phillips, 239 F.3d 829, 842 (7th Cir. 2001)); see United States v. Marji, 158 F.3d 60, 63 (2d
Cir. 1998).
32 The Supreme Court's most famous statement here is in In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358
(1970):
The reasonable-doubt standard plays a vital role in the American scheme of
criminal procedure. It is a prime instrument for reducing the risk of convictions
resting on factual error. The standard provides concrete substance for the
presumption of innocence - that bedrock "axiomatic and elementary" principle
whose "enforcement lies at the foundation of the administration of our criminal
law."... "[A] person accused of a crime... would be at a severe disadvantage,
a disadvantage amounting to a lack of fundamental fairness, if he could be
adjudged guilty and imprisoned for years on the strength of the same evidence
as would suffice in a civil case."
Id. at 363 (quoting Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432,453 (1895); W. v. Family Court,
247 N.E.2d 253,259 (N.Y. 1969) (Fuld, C.J., dissenting)) (second omission in original). See
generally United States v. Jiminez-Perez, 238 F.3d 970, 973 (8th Cir. 2001) (holding that
evidence must be sufficient to meet the reasonable doubt standard).
31 See United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 522-23 (1995) ("The Constitution gives
a criminal defendant the right to have a jury determine, beyond a reasonable doubt, his guilt
of every element of the crime with which he is charged.").
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with trial and pre-trial procedures in multi-defendant criminal cases.34 They speak
of the adequacy of the charging papers," complain of insufficient notice as to
charges,36 and question the discovery rules.37 Some of the sharpest critiques center
on venue in multi-defendant prosecutions and onjoinder and severance issues. The
location of the proceedings and the number of defendants prosecuted together have
a tremendous impact on the trial. If significant improvement is to be achieved in
balancing the competing interests of multiple defendants in criminal prosecutions,
it will need to be made in these two important areas.
A. Venue
Deciding where a person will face trial is one of the most important
3 The concerns have been raised for decades, nowhere more cogently than in Justice
Jackson's concurring opinion in Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 453 (1949)
(noting that large conspiracy trials create "an especially difficult situation for the defendant").
See generally supra note 3.
" Normally, an indictment is deemed sufficient if it simply demonstrates the elements of
the statutory offense. Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 117 (1974). Some courts,
however, have written that with conspiracy not as much detail or specificity is required as
with the underlying offense. United States v. Daily, 921 F.2d 994, 999 (10th Cir. 1990);
United States v. Tavelman, 650 F.2d 1133, 1137 (9th Cir. 1981). But see United States v.
Hajecate, 683 F.2d 894, 897 (5th Cir. 1982).
36 The pause here relates to the reluctance of courts to grant defense motions for bills of
particulars, even in complicated multi-party prosecutions. See generally United States v.
Barnes, 158 F.3d 662, 665-66 (2d Cir. 1998); United States v. Feola, 651 F. Supp. 1068,
1132 (S.D.N.Y. 1987), aff'd, 875 F.2d 857 (2d Cir. 1989).
31 Specific, but fairly narrow, rights of discovery are granted in a host of settings. See,
e.g., Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) (providing the constitutional basis for the
"Brady Rule"); United States v. Martinez, 151 F.3d 384, 390 (5th Cir. 1998) (discussing, in
part, the Jencks Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3500). Nevertheless, the limited scope of discovery can be
difficult especially in multi-party cases. For instance, statements ofco-conspirators generally
are not discoverable. United States v. Canty, 971 F. Supp. 687, 691 (N.D.N.Y. 1997).
Moreover, the protection offered in a large prosecution, even under Brady, may be more
apparent than real. That is, a defense challenge - resulting in dismissal - will prevail only
if the government did not disclose evidence which was both exculpatory and material. Parkus
v. Bowersox, 157 F.3d 1136, 1140-41 (8th Cir. 1998); United States v. Dollar, 25 F. Supp.
2d 1320 (N.D. Ala. 1998). As stated in John G. Douglass, Fatal Attraction? The Uneasy
Courtship of Brady and Plea Bargaining, 50 EMORY L.J. 437 (2001):
In the context of a trial, Brady is not a rule requiring disclosure of all - or even
most - information helpful to a defendant. Brady requires disclosure only of
information that is both "favorable" to the defense and "material" to guilt or
punishment. For advocates of broad discovery in criminal cases, the Court's
narrow view of "materiality" under Brady has been one of the largest
disappointments of the last quarter century.
Id. at 442 (citations oitted).
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determinations to be made in the entire criminal justice process. The requirement
of proper venue is found in the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution38
and has been praised repeatedly by American judges as "a safeguard against the
unfairness and hardship involved when an accused is prosecuted in a remote
place."39 Justice Frankfurter wrote that "[q]uestions of venue in criminal cases ...
are not merely matters of formal legal procedure. They raise deep issues of public
policy.
40
In multi-defendant prosecutions, the venue question is vitally important. By
definition, the charges involve more than one individual, people who themselves
may reside throughout this large country." The somewhat cavalier attitude which
has developed on the venue question over the past century in U.S. courts is both
surprising and disappointing. The rule for venue in multi-defendant cases - at
38 Although the Sixth Amendment refers to jury selection, it has been applied to have the
"impact of a venue provision." Norman Abrams, Conspiracy and Multi- Venue in Federal
Criminal Prosecutions: The Crime Committed Formula, 9 UCLA L. REv. 751, 751 n. 1
(1962). U.S.CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 3, also dealswith the matterbynoting thatcriminal trials
"shall be held in the State where the said crimes shall have been committed." See generally
United States v. Saavedra, 223 F.3d 85, 88 (2d Cir. 2000), cert. denied sub nom. Rodriguez
v. United States, 532 U.S. 976 (2001).
" United States v. Cores, 356 U.S. 405, 407 (1958). Early concerns about venue were
expressed in the Declaration of Independence. In issuing a string of complaints against King
George III, the drafters wrote, "For transporting us beyond Seas to be tried for pretended
offences." THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 21 (U.S. 1776).
40 United States v. Johnson, 323 U.S. 273,276 (1944). The lower courts, too, have been
somewhat extravagant in praising the venue provision as a bulwark for justice. See, e.g.,
United States v. Angotti, 105 F.3d 539, 541 (9th Cir. 1997) (affirming the "important
concerns that a criminal jury trial be held near the place where the crime was committed and
where prosecution can conveniently proceed."). The most recent statements on venue from
the Supreme Court - consistent with its earlier views - are found in United States v.
Rodriguez-Moreno, 526 U.S. 275, 281-82 (1999), and United States v. Cabrales, 524 U.S.
1 (1998). See generally United States v. Perez, 280 F.3d 318, 327-28 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
123 S. Ct. 231 (2002); United States v. Scott, 270 F.3d 30, 33 (1st Cir. 2001), cert. denied,
535 U.S. 1007 (2002); United States v. Ochoa, 229 F.3d 631,636-37 (7th Cir. 2000); United
States v. Bowens, 224 F.3d 302, 308 (4th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 944 (2001);
United States v. Romero, 150 F.3d 821, 826-27 (8th Cir. 1998).
41 See Abrams, supra note 38, at 752 (footnotes omitted) (discussing this problem forty
years.ago!):
Because of a variety of factors - including improvements in long-distance
communication and transportation facilities, the commercial and industrial
development of the nation, the growth of criminal groups organized nationwide
and the nature of crimes now covered by federal criminal laws - the incidence
of federal prosecutions involving crimes with some type ofmulti-district contacts
is today very large. Accordingly, the problem of determining proper venue in
such cases is today a recurring one.
Without question, as we shall see, the problem is far more acute today.
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least when conspiracy is alleged42 - can be stated easily: The prosecution may
pursue a conviction in any district43 in which an act by any conspirator was
committed in furtherance of the criminal endeavor." Had this act requirement been
construed narrowly, little problem would exist today.45 Early in the last century,
however, the Supreme Court allowed for a broad reading of the venue principle.
In Hyde v. United States,46 Justice Holmes challenged the majority to apply the
venue rules strongly in favor of the criminal conspiracy defendant.4 He contended
that the core of the crime of conspiracy was the agreement, so the proper site for
prosecution was the place where the agreement had been reached," not simply any
city where some act had been taken in furtherance of the agreement. He offered
deep concerns as to a contrary doctrine.
[T]he trial of crimes shall be held in the State and district where the
crimes shall have been committed. With the country extending from
ocean to ocean this requirement is even more important now than it was
42 The case almost always entails charges involving more than one defendant. See supra
note 3.
43 Under the federal rules. See United States v. Stewart, 256 F.3d 231,241 n.3 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied sub nom. Simms v. United States, 534 U.S. 1049 (2001), cert. denied sub nom.
Livingston v. United States, 535 U.S. 977 (2002); Saavedra, 223 F.3d at 94; United States
v. Tingle, 183 F.3d 719,726 (7th Cir. 1999); United States v. Bin Laden, 91 F. Supp. 2d 600,
612 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). The state requirements are essentially the same. See, e.g., State v.
Johnson, No. Crim. A. IN-00060900, 2000 WL 33113954, at *2 (Del. Super. Ct. Dec. 14,
2000); Hill v. State, 797 So. 2d 914, 916 (Miss. 2001); People v. Kassebaum, 744 N.E.2d
694 (N.Y. 2001); State v. Logue, No. W1999-01795-CCA-R3-CD, 2000 WL 1843248
(Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 15, 2000).
4 Perez, 280 F.3d at 329; United States v. Crozier, 259 F.3d 503, 519 (6th Cir. 2001),
cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1149, cert. denied sub nom. Burton v. United States, 534 U.S. 1171
(2002); United States v. Cordova, 157 F.3d 587, 597 (8th Cir. 1998). In most jurisdictions,
the government is obliged to prove proper venue by a preponderance of the evidence. Scott,
270 F.3d at 34; United States v. Carreon-Palacio, 267 F.3d 381, 391 (5th Cir. 2001); United
States v. Villarini, 238 F.3d 530,534 (4th Cir. 2001); United States v. Bala, 236 F.3d 87, 95
(2d Cir. 2000); United States v. Cryar, 232 F.3d 1318, 1323 (10th Cir. 2000), cert. denied,
532 U.S. 951 (2001); United States v. Jones, 231 F.3d 508, 516 (9th Cir. 2000); State v.
Logue, No. W1999-01795-CCA-R3-CD, 2000 WL 1843248 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 15,
2000). But see Jones v. State, 537 S.E.2d 80, 82 (Ga. 2000); State v. Cavallari, 571 N.W.2d
176, 181 (Wis. App. 1997) (holding that the State must prove venue beyond a reasonable
doubt).
" As with a limitation, for instance, that venue would be proper only in places where the
defendant resided or where a crime had been committed. See infra text accompanying notes
84-94.
46 225 U.S. 347 (1912).
" Id. at 384-91 (Holmes, J., dissenting). Justices Lurton, Hughes, and Lamar joined
Justice Holmes in that dissent.
" Or alternatively, where later planning meetings had been held. Hyde, 225 U.S. at 385.
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a hundred years ago, and must be enforced in letter and spirit if we are
to make impossible hardships amounting to grievous wrongs. In the case
of conspiracy the danger is conspicuously brought out. Every overt act
done in aid of it of course is attributed to the conspirators, and if that
means that the conspiracy is present as such wherever any overt act is
done, it might be at the choice of the Government to prosecute in any
one of twenty States in none of which the conspirators had been. And
as wherever two or more have united for the commission of a crime there
is a conspiracy, the opening to oppression thus made is very wide
indeed. 9
Hyde clearly illustrated just such a problem. The defendants in Hyde were
compelled to travel across the country and appear in Washington because their
attorney had entered a lawful appearance earlier before a federal agency there.
The majority was not persuaded by Holmes's concerns. These Justices saw the
overt act requirement in the federal conspiracy statute as an essential element of the
crime. ° Thus, wherever such an act occurred, a part of the crime was committed,
and it was then a proper place for prosecution of the alleged conspirators. In
response to the argument that such a reading of the statute could create serious and
unfair situations for criminal defendants, the Court responded forcefully:
We realize the strength of the apprehension that to extend the
jurisdiction of conspiracy by overt acts may give to the Government a
power which may be abused, and we do not wish to put out of view such
possibility. But there are counter considerations. It is not an oppression
in the law to accept the place where an unlawful purpose is attempted to
be executed as the place of its punishment, and rather conspirators be
taken from their homes than the victims and witnesses of the conspiracy
be taken from theirs. We must not, in too great a solicitude for the
criminal, give him a kind of immunity from punishment because of the
difficulty in convicting him - indeed, of even detecting him. And this
may result, if the rule contended for be adopted. Let him meet with his
fellows in secret and he will try to do so; let the place be concealed, as
it can be, and he and they may execute their crime in every State in the
Union and defeat punishment in all."
While the potential for serious mischief was present in Hyde, it certainly was
not inevitable that the holding would lead to the difficult situation we see today.
11 Id. at 386-87 (citation omitted).
'o Id. at 359.
" Id. at 363.
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After all, in Hyde much of the evidence regarding the crime was in Washington, the
attorney's act was not minor, all the defendants were well aware of the accused's
actions, and the overt act was a necessary element of the offense. Therefore, if
Hyde had been limited to its facts, the problems found in today's world never would
have appeared. Alas, Hyde has not been limited. Consider as a working illustration
a composite case drawn from a few actual prosecutions. Let us suppose an alleged
wide ranging conspiracy to import and distribute drugs nationally and also re-
distribute the drugs internationally.52 The "heads" of the scheme are in Atlanta,
Boston, Chicago, Seattle, and Washington. Each of these individuals, in turn, has
associates in several cities: Baltimore, Houston, Indianapolis, Kansas City, Las
Vegas, Miami, Milwaukee, New York, Newark, Philadelphia, Phoenix, Portland,
Richmond, San Francisco, and Shreveport. Each person takes some action related
to the broad operation" in his/her home district: twenty defendants, twenty cities,
twenty states. In chart form the prosecution looks like this:
rtland
BostonNYC/
La egsInd hIlly NewarkLas ega "' G~I aitimore
Atlanta Rich ond
Shreveport
With that illustration in mind, one must note that the reading given to the Hyde
venue holding has been generous to a fault. 4 Though the burden is on the
52 The drugs are being brought in from Asia and South America, sold throughout the
United States, and also shipped to Canada and Europe.
" Ranging from innocuous travel arrangements to serious crimes such as assault and
extortion.
" This, of course, is true in the federal system. In Rodriguez-Moreno, 526 U.S. 275
(1999), the Supreme Court wrote: "[V]enue [is] proper against [the] defendant in [any]
district where [a] co-conspirator carried out overt acts even though there was no evidence
that the defendant had ever entered that district or that the conspiracy was formed there." Id.
at 281-82; see also Prosper v. United States, 218 F.3d 883, 884 (8th Cir. 2000); United
States v. Josleyn, 99 F.3d 1182, 1191 (1st Cir. 1996); Badalamenti v. United States, No. 95
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government to establish proper venue, that burden usually is satisfied - as noted
earlier - by a preponderance of the evidence." Moreover, any act, however
"small"56 or "trivial,"57 will demonstrate venue. As one commentator noted, "[n]o
significant limitations are imposed on the nature and type of acts which suffice
tO... provide a basis for the laying of venue.""8 Moreover, all defendants charged
with being part of the plan will be held responsible for such acts,59 even if they were
not aware of the acts,60 or joined the group after the acts were completed.6 In
addition, the venue principle will apply to statutes that do not themselves require
proof of an overt act.62 With the above illustration, then, it is reasonably certain that
the twenty defendants could bejoined together for trial63 in any of the twenty cities;
moreover, the minor Phoenix, Arizona participant could be forced to travel for a
lengthy trial to Portland, Maine, the domicile of another minor participant. One can
conclude quite fairly that the venue result here is a sort of strict liability, or at most
adherence to a negligence standard. Defendants may be tried in any far-flung
district in which any act was committed at any time by any charged defendant so
long as it was done for the purpose of furthering the overall plan.64
Civ. 10128, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2601 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). That also is true in most states.
See, e.g., People v. Bobo, 897 P.2d 909, 913 (Colo. Ct. App. 1995); People v. Brown, 438
N.E.2d 250, 252 (Ill. App. Ct. 1982); see also CAL. PENAL CODE § 781 (1985).
5' See supra note 44.
16 United States v. Tingle, 183 F.3d 719, 728 (7th Cir. 1999).
57 As stated by Justice Jackson in Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S, 440, 453 (1949)
(Jackson, J., concurring).
58 Abrams, supra note 38, at 768. "[P]hone calls from one district to another by
themselves can establish venue in either district as long as the calls further the conspiracy."
United States v. Smith, 198 F.3d 377, 382 (2d Cir. 1999). One court has actually written that
flying over a landing site in a district could establish venue there. United States v. Fanello,
662 F.2d 505, 509 n.8 (8th Cir. 1981).
" United States v. Antonakeas, 255 F.3d 714,723 (9th Cir. 2001); United States v. Kim,
246 F.3d 186 (2d Cir. 2001). And, of course, direct proof of venue is not required,
circumstantial trial evidence will be sufficient. United States v. Jones, 231 F.3d 508, 516 (9th
Cir. 2000)..
61 United States v. Savage, 891 F.2d 145, 149 (7th Cir. 1989).
6 United States v. Davis, 666 F.2d 195, 200 (5th Cir. 1982). For most matters, including
venue, late-joining conspirators are held responsible for acts that their co-defendants
committed before their late entry. As stated in United States v. Goldberg, 105 F.3d 770 (1 st
Cir. 1997): "[A] late-joining conspirator takes the conspiracy as he finds it: 'a conspiracy is
like a train,' and 'when a party steps aboard, he is part of the crew, and assumes conspirator's
responsibility for the existing freight."' Id. at 775. See generally United States v. Wagner,
996 F.2d 906, 914 (7th Cir. 1993); United States v. Edwards, 945 F.2d 1387, 1403 (7th Cir.
1991).
62 Such as RICO and Title 21 drug offenses in the federal courts. United States v.
Rodriguez, 67 F.3d 1312, 1317-18 (7th Cir. 1995).
63 See infra Part III.B.
64 See generally United States v. Bala, 236 F.3d 87 (2d Cir. 2000).
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We have moved far with the venue rules. One must hasten to add, though, that
the federal system and most states employ checks to limit an unfair venue result
which might otherwise occur. First and foremost, there is the commonsense
realization that prosecutors are not likely to bring an action in a district distant from
a majority of the evidence, thousands of miles from the witnesses and investigators.
An unchallengeable statement, but hardly dispositive. In a case such as the one
posited earlier,65 the witnesses, investigators, and evidence may be scattered all over
the country. It simply is not self-evident which city would be most convenient for
the government under the circumstances. Moreover, with the great discretion given
to prosecutors as to where, how, and whom to charge,66 good reasons may exist for
the government seeking to go to a somewhat distant locale. In particular, to put the
matter bluntly, prosecutors may expect the imposition of more severe punishment
for convicted defendants in some places than in other places. Indeed, even in the
federal system where sentencing guidelines exist, there is little doubt that serious
sentencing disparities between federal districts are seen rather routinely.67
The major check on burdensome venue decisions rests not with prosecutors but
with trial judges who are given wide powers to alleviate such problems. Federal
Rule of Criminal Procedure 21 (b) allows the trial judge to transfer the proceedings,
at the defendant's request, "in the interest of justice. '68 However, the hope of
deference to negatively-impacted defendants never has been realized. These
provisions, in both federal and state prosecutions, often are not applied in favor of
criminal defendants. 69 To the contrary, they usually are construed quite narrowly
in response to removal motions based on venue hardships.7"
65 See supra text accompanying notes 52-53.
66 See generally Ellen S. Podgor, The Ethics and Professionalism of Prosecutors in
Discretionary Decisions, 68 FORDHAM L. REv. 1511 (2000).
67 A study by the Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse of Syracuse University,
using Departments of Justice statistics, demonstrated that the goal of uniformity in the
Federal Guidelines has hardly been fully accomplished, with serious variances found even
among adjacent districts. The information is reported in Michael Higgins, Sizing Up
Sentences, A.B.A.J., Nov. 1999, at 42.
68 FED. R. CRIM. P. 21(b). The state rules are similar. See, for example, Section 1033(a)
of the California Penal Code, which allows for transfer if "there is a reasonable likelihood
that a fair and impartial trial cannot be had in the county." CAL. PENAL CODE § 1033(a)
(1985).
69 In California, for instance, according to one report, "[i]t is extremely rare for a change
of venue to be granted." Laurie L. Levenson, Change of Venue and the Role of the Criminal
Jury, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 1533, 1539 n.27 (1993).
70 Professor Wright commented: "In no case has a final judgment been reversed on this
ground." 2 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 347, at 425-26
(3d ed. 2000). 1 too have found no case - not one - in which the defense transfer request
was denied at the trial level and then reversed on appeal because the requested location
would be more fair to the defense. Only two came close to such a result. One is Matter of
Phillip R. Balsimo, 68 F.3d 185 (7th Cir. 1995), wherein mandamus was issued to require
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The case that established the manner in which transfer rules function
demonstrates several key points. First, the Supreme Court's opinion in Platt v.
Minnesota Mining andManufacturing Co."' was rendered in an antitrust matter, not
a major, more typical, criminal prosecution. Second, the entire opinion is less than
a dozen paragraphs long, with a minimal treatment of the transfer request question.7 2
It is so minimal, in fact, that it essentially only restates the dissenting circuit judge's
view of the numerous considerations present with such a request. Third, and
perhaps most to the point, it is the only "extended" treatment by the Court of this
matter in a non-publicity case.73
A few important principles emerge from Platt. The heavily cited notion is that
the transfer issue generally raises numerous factors for consideration by the trial
judge.74 The location of the defendant is only one of these, not necessarily the most
important. To be sure, the Court in Platt rejected the defendant's request for
transfer in forceful fashion:
The fact that Minnesota is the main office or "home" of the respondent
has no independent significance in determining whether transfer to that
the district court to reconsider denial of the motion for change of venue; the district court had
placed upon the defendant the burden of establishing "truly compelling circumstances," for
this change, but the correct standard was whether, "all relevant things considered, the case
would be better off transferred to another district." Id. at 187. The other is United States v.
Williams, 274 F.3d 1079 (6th Cir. 2001). There the appeals judges did indeed reverse the
lower court and order that the matter be transferred to another district. Id. at 1085. In that
case, however, the defendant did not argue that his alleged behavior was more properl" seen
as having occurred in Texas rather than Michigan. Id. at 1083. Instead, he argued- and the
appeals court agreed - that venue was never proper at all in Michigan. Id. at 1084-85. To
be sure, "Michigan was chosen as a venue solely for the convenience of the government[;
n]one of the overt acts ... occurred in Michigan and the conspiracy had no effect in
Michigan. Moreover, it was never intended to have any effect there." Id. at 1085.
376 U.S. 240 (1964).
72 Id. at 241.
73 There are numerous cases in which courts consider problems concerning venue and
pretrial publicity. The courts' views as to transfer here are considerably more defense-
oriented. For instance, see the discussion in United States v. Blom, 242 F.3d 799 (8th Cir.),
cert. denied, 534 U.S. 880 (2001), and United States v. Volpe, 42 F. Supp. 2d 204 (E.D.N.Y.
1999).
71 Some examples of those factors include:
(1) location of corporate defendant; (2) location of possible witnesses; (3)
location of events likely to be in issue; (4) location of documents and records
likely to be involved; (5) disruption of defendant's business unless the case is
transferred; (6) expense to the parties; (7) location of counsel; (8) relative
accessibility of place of trial; (9) docket condition of each district or division
involved; and (10) any other special elements which might affect the transfer.
Platt, 376 U.S. at 243-44.
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district would be "in the interest of justice," although it may be
considered with reference to such factors as the convenience of records,
officers, personnel and counsel."
The lower courts certainly have not extended Platt in favor of criminal
defendants raising venue concerns. Judges do not transfer mainly to accommodate
defendants;76 the convenience of witnesses and the government is weighed
heavily." In addition, the trial judge's rejection of the transfer requests will only
be overturned on a showing of an abuse of discretion.7" Whatever relief might have
been present for the venue-burdened criminal defendant is not to be found in the
laws of transfer or change of venue.79 The transfer decision is rarely made in favor
of the defense.8
i ld. at 245-46. As stated in United States v. Maldonado-Rivera, 922 F.2d 934 (2d Cir.
1990): "No one of these considerations is dispositive, and '[i]t remains for the court to try
to strike a balance and determine which factors are of greatest importance."' Id. at 966
(quoting United States v. Stephenson, 895 F.2d 867, 895 (2d Cir. 1990)).
76 United States v. Scholl, 166 F.3d 964, 970 (9th Cir. 1999); United States v. Bittner,
728 F.2d 1038, 1041 (8th Cir. 1984).
17 United States v. Kopituk, 690 F.2d 1289, 1322 (1 1th Cir. 1982) (discussing the
convenience ofjoining twelve defendants as well as the government's interest in promoting
"judicial economy").
7 United States v. Fagan, 821 F.2d 1002, 1008 (5th Cir. 1987). As stated in UnitedStates
v. Hunter, 672 F.2d 815 (10th Cir. 1982): "The facts must compel and not merely support
venue transfer before an abuse of discretion will be found by an appellate court." Id. at 816;
see also supra note 70.
7' A review of the cases makes clear that the courts have been decidedly unsympathetic
to defense claims as to the need for the granting of a transfer motion. Good illustrations of
this point can be seen in United States v. Jordan, 223 F.3d 676, 684-86 (7th Cir. 2000)
(involving a resident of Puerto Rico being tried in Chicago); United States v. Heaps, 39 F.3d
479,482-83 (4th Cir. 1994) (involving a New York defendant being tried in Virginia, though
co-defendants notjoined with him and he personally took no actions in Virginia); and United
States v. Morrison, 946 F.2d 484,489-90 (7th Cir. 1991) (proper to have a resident ofPuerto
Rico being tried in Milwaukee, even though a majority of the criminal actions took place in
Puerto Rico). See generally United States v. Hunter, 672 F.2d 815 (10th Cir. 1982).
" It is particularly striking how different the analysis is here compared with the quite
broad reading of defense transfer motions found in civil actions under FED. R. Civ. P. 21,
which provides for transfer of venue "in the interest ofjustice." That language is identical
to the language in FED. R. CRIm. P. 21. Trial judges appear far more inclined to order a
transfer for the convenience of the parties in actions under the civil rules.
In order to transfer a civil action, a court must examine factors set out in the
statute as well as other factors that involve public or private interests. The
statutory factors are: (1) the convenience of the parties; (2) the convenience of
the witnesses; (3) the interest of justice; and (4) whether the case could have
been brought in the proposed transferee forum. The court must also balance
some of the public and private interests at stake in the litigation in addition to
[Vol. 11:67
MULTIPLE-DEFENDANT CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS
This discussion is not offered to suggest that venue problems arise in all or most
multiple-defendant prosecutions without any possible viable remedy present. Still,
such problems do surface regularly, and when they do, they can be most serious.
Hyde itself is a good illustration, as the defendants there were required to appear
three thousand miles from their residences, based on a lawful and relatively minor
action by their agent.8' In today's world with prosecutions of more than one or even
two dozen defendants scattered throughout the country, the current broad and liberal
venue rule can truly be devastating to the defendants in a number of ways. It can
create tremendous costs to be borne by the parties, affect the ability to present
documentary evidence and numerous witnesses, and limit the opportunity to prepare
adequately for the trial. It will not do for the courts to respond, as in Hyde and
Platt, by relying on an outdated and conclusory argument that a conspiracy is
committed in any district in which any minor overt act took place and that undue
burdens can be eliminated through the transfer power.82
With the movement toward bigger trials nationwide, there can be little doubt
that Justice Holmes was on the right track in his Hyde dissent, though perhaps his
opinion was too restrictive. 3 With Holmes's concerns in the forefront, surely there
is a middle ground between the two positions in Hyde.
I propose just such a middle ground. Allow the prosecution great flexibility in
establishing venue, but not complete freedom to proceed in any district in which
some act occurred. Venue ought not to be proper if the parties flew over a city,
placed a call into it, or merely sent a representative to it for some minor chore.
Rather, the law should give the government several, finite options. Prosecute, as
Justice Holmes wrote, where the agreement was born. 4 Or, charge a particular
examining the elements set out in the statute, such as: (1) the plaintiffs choice
of forum; (2) the relative ease of access to sources of proof; (3) the availability.
of compulsory process for attendance of unwilling witnesses; (4) the possibility
ofviewing premises, if applicable; (5) the cost ofobtaining attendance of willing
witnesses; (6) all other practical problems that make trial of a case easy,
expeditious, and inexpensive; and (7) "public interest" factors, including the
relative congestion of court dockets, choice of law considerations, and the
relationship of the community in which the courts and jurors are required to
serve to the occurrences that give rise to the litigation. The burden of
establishing the need for transfer rests with the moving party. The court also has
broad discretion to determine "whether convenience and fairness considerations
weigh in favor of transfer."
Am. Littoral Soc'y v. EPA, 943 F. Supp. 548, 549-50 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (citations omitted).
While the language in the two provisions is the same, this sort of broad discussion - while
common in civil actions - is rare in reported criminal cases.
SI Hyde v. United States, 225 U.S. 347, 359-60 (1912).
82 See, e.g., id.; Platt v. Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co., 376 U.S. 240, 243-44 (1964).
83 See Hyde, 225 U.S. at 386-87 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
84 See id. at 389-90.
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defendant in any district in which she personally took any act - however minor -
in furtherance of the scheme.85 Or, all defendants could be tried in a district in
which something other than a minor act took place, perhaps a "substantial step"
toward the ultimate goal.86 Finally, the proposal would allow the government to
establish venue in a district in which even a minor act occurred, so long as the
parties had earlier agreed specifically that such a place would be involved in the
endeavor.
While such a "middle ground" approach might give Justice Holmes some
hesitation, 7 it is a great improvement over the "strict liability" attitude8 currently
in place. To ensure careful compliance with these requirements, the law should
mandate both explicit findings on the trial court record89 and the option for an
interlocutory appeal by either party. This approach has been used effectively
elsewhere in criminal justice process conspiracy cases9" and would impose little
added burden when compared to the tremendous impact of the venue
determination.9 If we are serious that venue raises "deep issues of public policy,"92
85 Of course, the price to be paid here would be a more expanded view of severance, as
discussed infra Part III.B.
86 Borrowing from the law of attempt. The courts have generously construed the
"substantial step" requirement, but have drawn the line in connection with genuinely minor
acts. See, e.g., United States v. McDowell, 250 F.3d 1354 (1 1th Cir. 2001); United States v.
Duran, 96 F.3d 1495 (D.C. Cir. 1996); Walters v. Maass, 45 F.3d 1355 (9th Cir. 1995).
87 After all, for him, venue was proper only in the district in which the agreement was
formed.
88 Under strict liability, unlike responsibility for the crime itself, the defendants are
charged with co-defendant's actions - however insubstantial - if unintended and even if
completely unforeseen and unforeseeable. See generally United States v. Matthews, 168 F.3d
1234, 1246 (1 lth Cir. 1999).
89 Such findings should include why transfer would not be in the interest of justice - in
response to the defense request - and why it is most fair to have the trial conducted in the
particular city requested by the prosecution.
90 Both are routinely imposed with the use of co-conspirator declarations. See, e.g.,
United States v. Rodriguez, 975 F.2d 404,408 (7th Cir. 1992); United States v. Layton, 720
F.2d 548 (9th Cir. 1983); United States v. Bolla, 685 F.2d 929, 933 (5th Cir. 1982); United
States v. Fitts, 635 F.2d 664, 666 (8th Cir. 1980) (ordering that findings that the statement
was made by a conspirator during and in furtherance of the scheme); United States v. Perry,
624 F.2d 29, 30 (5th Cir. 1980). The explicit finding requirement is seen often in connection
with determinations by the trial court that probative value of evidence outweighs its
prejudicial impact. See, e.g., United States v. Ward, 190 F.3d 483, 494 (6th Cir. 1999);
White v. United States, 148 F.3d 787, 792 (7th Cir. 1998).
9' In the federal courts, an accommodation would have to be made, for the statutes that
allow government appeals on an interlocutory basis apply to certain "final decisions," as
noted in In re Sealed Case, 893 F.2d 363, 366 (D.C. Cir. 1990), and would not appear to
cover venue determinations (or joinder and severance decisions, as proposed infra). 18
U.S.C. § 3731 allows for government interlocutory appeals with dismissals of indictments,
suppression, or exclusion of evidence, the status determination and transfer order of
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any added minimal burden should be readily accepted.93
This venue proposal strikes a reasonable balance. On the one hand, it allows
the prosecution to choose from an array of venue locations, necessary in today's
world of national and international conspiracies. On the other hand, it avoids most
of the problems anticipated by Justice Holmes in Hyde. Under this proposed
system, defendants could not be prosecuted in districts in which they had,
realistically, no serious contact and from which they could not transfer prior to
trial.94
B. Joinder of Defendants for Trial
1. In Support
It is not at all unusual today, in both the state and federal criminal justice
systems, to see unwieldy, complicated, and complex jury proceedings involving
large numbers of criminal defendants being tried together. This is not to suggest
that the problem here is a new one - that would hardly be the case. Justice
Jackson more than half a century ago railed against "Government institute[d] mass
trials." '95 Almost a quarter century ago, one prominent commentator carried the
argument further by recommending major changes to avoid these sorts of
challenging trials.96 Still, the problem is worse today, as we are seeing greater
numbers of large, complicated, joint-defendant trials than ever before.97 It is not
juveniles, and the directed release ofdefendants. See United States v. M.C.E., 232 F.3d 1252
(9th Cir. 2000); United States v. Holt, 229 F.3d 931 (10th Cir. 2000); United States v.
Cherry, 217 F.3d 811 (10th Cir. 2000); United States v. Delatorre, 157 F.3d 1205 (10th Cir.
1998).
92 See supra text accompanying note 40.
" Certainly there would be added burdens, and legitimate concerns have been expressed
as to such burdens, particularly with interlocutory appeals. "[T]he delays and disruptions
attendant upon intermediate appeal are especially inimical to the effective and fair
administration of the criminal law." DiBella v. United States, 369 U.S. 121, 126 (1962).
Truly, no one would wish to create further delays and disruptions in the criminal justice
process. Still, the issues here are of great import; moreover, the interlocutory appeals process
with evidentiary rulings appears to run elsewhere without major difficulty. If there is a price
to be paid for this process, that price would appear to be reasonable.
94 See generally Long Criminal Trials, supra note 4, at 183 (remarks of Judge J. Joseph
Smith) (discussing the problems of people "tried in places remote from their homes").
9 Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring).
96 Robert 0. Dawson, Joint Trials of Defendants in Criminal Cases: An Analysis of
Efficiencies and Prejudices, 77 MICH. L. REv. 1379 (1979) (asserting that criminal
responsibility is individual and suggesting that courts relax the requirement that defendants
must show compelling reasons for severance).
97 See supra note 3; see also infra text accompanying notes 101-104. See generally
Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 209 (1987) ("Joint trials play a vital role in the criminal
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that the law has changed. For many years in both state and federal courts,
prosecutors have been given considerable discretion in charging single, huge
conspiracies.9" The standing rule for these cases has been that parties charged
together as co-conspirators generally can be tried together.99 True enough. But the
manner in which this rule is applied has changed. The experience in the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit Appeals over the past several years is
instructive, if hardly unique.'°°
In United States v. Posada-Rios,0 ' thirty-five defendants were charged with
various drug offenses in a 134-page indictment, ten defendants were convicted after
justice systems.").
" It is hombook law that the criminal law allows the government to prosecute for one
conspiracy many individuals who do not know each other, who are living in varied parts of
the country, and who are engaged in different criminal activities. The rationale - often
played out with metaphors of chains and links, or wheels, spokes, and hubs - is that each
individual is part of the larger operation, each acting to further the broad interests of that
operation. It is this principle which allows the twenty defendants in the earlier illustration to
be charged together, though the actions of most of them would appear to be not wholly
related to the actions of the others. Moreover, if the proof at trial demonstrates distinct
smaller conspiracies, rather than a single overarching scheme, the defendants will not
necessarily benefit; the trial judge generally determines the propriety ofjoinder on the basis
of the indictment alone. United States v. Dominguez, 226 F.3d 1235, 1240 (11 th Cir. 2000)
(holding that joinder of drug charges and mortgage fraud charges was proper). Under the
doctrine of retroactive misjoinder, if the evidence at trial shows that joinder was not proper,
the question then is whether bringing the defendants together at trial necessarily resulted in
substantial prejudice to the defense. See Schaffer v. United States, 362 U.S. 511 (1960).
99 See generally Zafiro v. United States, 506 U.S. 534, 537 (1993).
10 See, for instance, these recent cases from other circuits: United States v. Albers, 226
F.3d 989 (9th Cir. 2000) (prosecution of twelve defendants for BASE (Buildings, Antennas,
Spans, and Earth)jumping from peaks in national parks), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1114 (2001);
United States v. Saavedra, 223 F.3d 85 (2d Cir. 2000) (prosecution of twelve members of a
violent gang), cert. deniedsub nom. Rodriguez v. United States, 532 U.S. 976 (2001); United
States v. Patterson, 215 F.3d 776 (7th Cir.) (trial of fifteen defendants on drug charges),
vacated inpart on other grounds, 531 U.S. 1033 (2000); United States v. Jackson, 207 F.3d
910 (7th Cir.) (twelve defendants in a three-month trial), vacated on other grounds, 531 U.S.
953 (2000), reinstated, 236 F.3d 886 (7th Cir. 2001); United States v. Diaz, 176 F.3d 52 (2d
Cir. 1999) (trial of ten defendants involved in a racketeering enterprise); United States v.
Magana, 118 F.3d 1173 (7th Cir. 1997) (sixty-six-count indictment, five-week trial of eight
defendants, and over four hundred taped conversations in English, Spanish, orAssyrian being
received in evidence); United States v. Baker, 10 F.3d 1374 (9th Cir. 1993) (fifteen
defendants in a sixteen-month trial in which there were nearly two hundred limiting
instructions given to the jury); United States v. Accetturo, 842 F.2d 1408 (3d Cir. 1988)
(twenty-six defendants in a fifteen-month trial); United States v. Parks, No. 95-CR-510, 1998
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9967 (N.D. Ill. June 17, 1998) (twelve defendants in a sixteen-week trial);
United States v. Balogun, 971 F. Supp. 1215 (N.D. Ill. 1997) (twenty-four defendants).
ot 158 F.3d 832 (5th Cir. 1998).
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eighty-four days of trial. The resulting appellate opinion took more than fifty pages
to dispose of the many contentions involving the length of the trial and the "tense
atmosphere created by the high security required."' 2 Ten defendants were tried
together in United States v. Morrow,' 3 in spite of the fact that numerous items of
evidence were admitted as to some charges, but not all, and were admitted against
some of the defendants, but not all. The jury returned convictions against the nine
defendants in United States v. Brown,10 4 another drug case; the criminal acts there
were shown to have been committed over a seven year period.
Certainly it is true that many of the appeals judges considering the experience
in the Fifth Circuit, and elsewhere, express concerns and doubts as to the fairness
of such a complex and lengthy process.'05 The fact remains, though, that in most,
if not all, reported decisions and in each of these cited cases,'0 6 the courts rejected
the defense arguments as to the prejudicial impact of the joinder of large numbers
of defendants. It will take a very powerful argument to persuade a trial judge as to
the merits of a severance motion. As noted recently in the Fifth Circuit, it is not
enough for the defense to offer "[m]ere generalized criticism of megatrials," the
defendants must demonstrate substantial prejudice resulting from specific isolated
events at trial.'07
The problems here are not isolated; throughout the nation there are quite a
number of these large, joint trials today.'08 Several reasons can be suggested for this
phenomenon. Prosecutors assert forcefully that such trials are necessary to save
judicial resources and to ensure that jurors have a full picture of the entire criminal
10' Id. at 863.
103 177 F.3d 272 (5th Cir. 1999).
14 217 F.3d 247 (5th Cir. 2000).
os See, e.g., United States v. Ellender, 947 F.2d 748, 751 (5th Cir. 1991); see also infra
note 125-26 and accompanying text.
106 See supra note 100.
107 Posada-Rios, 158 F.3d at 863.
'0' The number of multiple-defendant trials, though large and seemingly growing, is
considerably less than one would imagine, given the enormous number ofmultiple-defendant
indictments brought. After pre-trial skirmishes (with motions concerning venue, severance,
and evidence), many defendants plead guilty. See, e.g., United States v. Colon, No. 97-CR-
659, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21681 (N.D. I11. Jan. 8, 1999); United States v. O'Neill, 27 F.
Supp. 2d 1121 (E.D. Wis. 1998); United States v. Chavez, No. 97-CR. 197-D, 1998 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 22646 (D. Colo. May 12, 1998); United States v. Guzman, 11 F. Supp. 2d 292
(S.D.N.Y.), aft'd, 152 F.3d 921 (2d Cir. 1998). Illustrative is United States v. Kipp, 990 F.
Supp. 102 (N.D.N.Y. 1998) in which more than seventy defendants were indicted; after
severance motions were denied, most of the defendants pleaded guilty. That case is
noteworthy, because the defendant Kipp was named in only one count of the charging
document.
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endeavor. 9 Though many have strongly challenged this view t10 it is one that
continues to be made and that does have some validity to it. After all, if, in the
previous example of the joint prosecution,"' the government had to conduct twenty
separate proceedings against the twenty defendants, chaos might reign. As stated
by the Supreme Court:
Joint trials play a vital role in the criminal justice system, accounting for
almost one-third of federal criminal trials in the past five years. Many
joint trials - for example, those involving large conspiracies to import
and distribute illegal drugs - involve a dozen or more codefendants.
Confessions by one or more of the defendants are commonplace .... It
would impair both the efficiency and the fairness of the criminal justice
system to require, in all these cases ofjoint crimes where incriminating
statements exist, that prosecutors bring separate proceedings, presenting
the same evidence again and again, requiring victims and witnesses to
repeat the inconvenience (and sometimes trauma) of testifying, and
randomly favoring the last-tried defendants who have the advantage of
knowing the prosecution's case beforehand. Joint trials generally serve
the interests of justice by avoiding inconsistent verdicts and enabling
more accurate assessment of relative culpability - advantages which
sometimes operate to the defendant's benefit. Even apart from these
tactical considerations,joint trials generally serve the interests ofjustice
by avoiding the scandal and inequity of inconsistent verdicts." 2
The prevailing position in both federal and state courts is that "there is a clear
preference that defendants who are indicted together be tried jointly,"Jt and the
rules are to be "construed liberally" in favor ofjoinder."4 To be sure, the argument
'09 See, e.g., Kevin P. Hein, Joinder and Severance, 30 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1139, 1158-59
(1993).
"10 See Dawson, supra note 96.
.. See infra notes 53-54 and accompanying text.
112 Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 209-10 (1987). See generally United States v.
Gibbs, 182 F.3d 408,434 (6th Cir. 1999) ("Courts typically favor the joinder of defendants
... because it is more efficient than conducting separate trials.").
113 United States v. Jackson, 180 F.3d 55, 75 (2d Cir. 1999); see also United States v.
Frazier, 280 F.3d 835, 844 (8th Cir.) (stating that it is rare for a court to "sever the trial of
alleged coconspirators"), cert. denied sub nom. Robinson v. United States, 122 S. Ct. 2317,
cert. denied sub nom. Thomas v. United States, 122 S. Ct. 2606, cert. denied, 123 S Ct. 255
(2002); Phillips v. Commonwealth, 17 S.W.3d 870, 877 (Ky. 2000); State v. Turner, 956
P.2d 215, 217 (Or. App. 1998) ("Jointly charged defendants shall be tried jointly unless the
court concludes before trial that it is clearly inappropriate to do so .... ).
"' United States v. Sarkisian, 197 F.3d 966, 975 (9th Cir. 1999). See generally United
States v. Novaton, 271 F.3d 968, 988-89 (1 1th Cir. 2001) ("Nevertheless, because of the
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is reinforced by counting the number of states that reject the federal view and
establish a presumption against joinder. How many such states are there? None,
not even one."' This inquiry wields a rather strong indication that judges and
legislators overwhelmingly, almost without dissent," 6 recognize the need for, and
importance of, joinder of defendants for trial." 7
It also should be emphasized that the broad rules concerning venue support the
decisions of prosecutors to join large numbers of defendants for trial. As discussed
previously, co-conspirators normally can be tried in any district or city in which any
defendant took any act, however minor, in furtherance of the plan."' Thus, the
defendant may not be heard to complain that, as a result ofjoinder, she will have
to cross the country to defend herself in a place where she has never been and where
only a trivial action was taken by someone she had never even met. Of course, if
the earlier suggestions of this Article were to be adopted - requiring the trial in
places only where major actions were taken or where the defendant herself had been
- the impact on the ability to join together large numbers of defendants would be
substantial. 9 Without some sort of change, it is clear that the liberal rules of venue
encourage the liberal application of the joinder rules, just as those same wide rules
for joinder encourage the wide use of the venue rules.
well-settled principle that it is preferred that persons who are charged together should also
be tried together... the denial of a motion for severance will be reversed only for an abuse
of discretion."), cert. denied 122 S. Ct. 2345 (2002).
" One of the last "hold out" states was Minnesota, which previously had a statute that
"strongly favor[ed] separate trials .... State v. Duncan, 250 N.W.2d 189, 198 (Minn. 1977).
The statute provided thatjointly charged defendants "shall be tried separately," though giving
the trial court the power to order a joint trial "in the interest of justice and not related to
economy or economy." The law was changed, and the new statute eliminates the preference
for separate trials. It provides:
When two or more defendants are jointly charged with a felony, they may be
tried separately or jointly in the discretion of the court. In making its
determination on whether to order joinder or separate trials, the court shall
consider the nature of the offense charged, the impact on the victim, the potential
prejudice to the defendant, and the interest ofjustice.
MINN. R. CRIM. P. 17.03.
116 The view is not entirely unanimous. See infra text accompanying notes 128-29.
" As seen by this practice: Even in the situations where joinder was improperly used, or
severance wrongly refused, the court will still seek to determine if the error affected
substantial rights. See Sarkisian, 197 F.3d at 976. That determination is not often made.
118 See supra Part III.A.
"9 After all, with our identified group of twenty defendants, no more than five or six
would likely have ever personally been to a particular city; moreover, only a few of the cities
would be identified as a place where a substantial step had been taken in furtherance of the
overall conspiracy.
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2. In Response
These rules as to joinder - coupled with the venue principles - do not make
sense in today's world. Before turning to specific problems created by such joinder,
it is important to note that the supposed benefits offered by large trials are often
illusive. A key benefit, we are told, is that the joint trial eliminates the need for
ordinary citizens to testify repeatedly. 2 ' One prominent commentator evaluated
this argument many years ago and concluded that the fear of citizen witnesses being
forced to testify several times in multiple jurisdictions ifjoinder were not available
simply is not the reality. In large conspiracy cases, the essential witnesses often are
not truly disinterested parties. Instead, they are government officers, undercover
agents, and formerly charged defendants. 2 ' It also is often asserted that the joint
trial is economical; it saves money. '22 It is highly doubtful that most large trials will
necessarily result in many tangible benefits, economic or otherwise. Consider, for
example, another case cited above: United States v. Baker.'23 There, the court
conceded that "joint trials 'conserve state funds, diminish inconvenience to
witnesses and public authorities, and avoid delays in bringing those accused of
crime to trial."" 24 In a prosecution, however, in which the government conducted
"one of the lengthiest and costliest trials in this nation's history"'25 the judges
concluded, with a fair measure of exasperation, that "the claim that joint trials save
120 See supra text accompanying note 112.
121 Dawson, supra note 96, at 1384-85:
A second presumed efficiency of joint trials is that they are more convenient for
witnesses. In fact, however, the effect ofjoint trials on witnesses varies greatly from
case to case and depends in part on whether the witness is a civilian or a
professional. To involve lay witnesses in the prosecution of a case certainly forces
real burdens upon them. They must leave work or home to testify, and an important
witness may be required to remain at the courthouse throughout the trial. If the
witness is a child or the victim of an alleged sex offense, we do not want him to
repeat the trauma oftestifying without excellent reasons. Most witnesses in criminal
trials, however, are not civilians but professionals. The burden of presenting
witnesses lies upon the government, whose witnesses are usually police officers,
laboratory employees, prosecution investigators, and others whose jobs include
testifying in court. While time away from the patrol beat or the laboratory is time
away from important work, professional witnesses suffer little personal
inconvenience or expense by testifying more than once. Thus, when assessing the
inconvenience that separate trials impose on witnesses, we should ask whether
testifying is part of their jobs.
122 See Fed. Bar Council Comm., supra note 4, at 138.
123 10 F.3d 1374 (9th Cir. 1993).
124 Id. at 1387 (citing United States v. Lane, 474 U.S. 438, 449 (1986)).
125 The case at issue consisted of a sixteen-month trial with thirty thousand pages of
transcripts and involving tvo thousand narcotics transactions over an eleven-year period. Id.
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time and serve judicial economy is ludicrous under the present facts." 126
Support for the large joint trial also comes from those who assert that such a
proceeding avoids inconsistencies and does not unduly affect the, accused
individual's ability to defend.'27 The problem, however, is that in many cases in
which multiple defendants are tried together, serious questions are raised as to
whether defendants truly receive individualized attention from jurors. The primary
question is whether each person will be convicted as a result of overwhelming
evidence against him, or, as Justice Jackson lamented decades ago, will jurors
conclude that if a few defendants are notoriously bad people, the defendants must
all be guilty because "birds of a feather are flocked together."'28 In Baker, the Ninth
Circuit echoed this concern:
Most importantly, the human limitations of the jury system and the
consequent risk of spillover prejudice cannot be ignored. This risk is
particularly acute for comparatively peripheral defendants ... whose
separate trial could have been concluded in a matter of days or weeks,
but who was required to sit in the courtroom during months of proof
involving entirely unrelated conspiracies and substantive offenses....
When a seasoned prosecutor is unable to keep track of nearly 200
limiting instructions given over the course of a 16-month trial, our faith
in a lay jury's ability to do so is stretched to the limit. Our presumption
that a jury is able to follow the trial court's instructions is "rooted less in
the absolute certitude that the presumption is true than in the belief that
it represents a reasonable practical accommodation of the interests of the
state and the defendant in the criminal justice process." . . . The
126 Id. at 1389. Note these observations of a group of experienced trial lawyers:
Although most commentators have focused upon the prejudice the very long
criminal trial may cause to defendants and the court itself, the Committee is mindful
of the detrimental impact such trials can have upon the prosecution. While defense
lawyers point to the dangers of a verdict of "guilt by association" or "conviction by
confusion," the problem of"acquittal by comparison" cannot be ignored. One ofthe
longest racketeering prosecutions in recent history - United States v. Accetturo -
concluded this year in Newark federal court after 15 months of trial with a verdict
acquitting each of the approximately two dozen defendants. Observers of the trial
have speculated that the jury's verdict may represent either an angry attack on the
prosecution for the length of the trial or an abdication of the jurors' responsibilities
occasioned by their inability or refusal to deliberate over the enormous volume of
evidence introduced at the trial. Of course, whether the very long trial results in
prejudice to the defendant, prosecution, jurors of the court itself is beside the point.
Any such prejudice tarnishes the criminal justice system and is unacceptable.
Fed. Bar Council Comm., supra note 4, at 138.
127 See supra text accompanying note 112.
128 See Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 454 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring).
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presumption is not irrebuttable.I29
The proposition here can be broadened to encompass harm to the government
as well. Many cases exist in which large numbers of defendants are brought
togetherand in which the prosecution has not benefitted from the joint proceedings.
Consider, for instance, the case of United States v. Ellender.'30 In that case, the
government went forward with an enormously complicated case which created
rather incredible practical problems. m3' Judge Jones on appeal was not kind in her
appraisal of the situation:
These appeals are the remnants of an ambitious drug prosecution
involving a cast of 187 defendants, scores of witnesses, numerous sailing
vessels, many thousands of pounds of marijuana, and hundreds of
kilograms of cocaine. Courtroom spectators heard accounts of great
intrigue spanning several years and involving colorful characters,
including a certain deposed Central American dictator. Twenty-three
defendants, less than a sixth of the named defendants, were eventually
tried. As the dust settled in the specially-modified courtroom, only a
handful of defendants stood convicted. The low ratio of convictions to
the number of defendants tried, plus the very small sentences against
those convicted, best demonstrate the flaw in the government's apparent
assumption that "bigger is better" in this type of proceeding.I32
With these examples as the principal justifications for allowingjoinder of many
defendants for the "mega-trials," one ought to be skeptical. Moreover, we would do
well to pause and reconsider the sage words of Judge Lehman, written years ago.
129 Baker, 10 F.3d 1374 at 1391 (citations omitted).
'30 947 F.2d 748 (5th Cir. 1991).
13' As noted by the Fifth Circuit:
The government's aspirations of conducting a megatrial were limited only by the
physical bounds of courtroom walls. Each defendant and attorney was limited to a
small writing space crowded into a block-seating arrangement. Bleachers were
installed. Seating charts were issued to jurors and trial participants to facilitate
identification. A special intercom system of dubious efficacy was installed for
"bench conferences." When an attorney wished to address the court and fellow
counsel privately, the jurors were treated to background music. However, this
intended distraction proved futile, and counsel turned to the time-honored method
of hushed voices and bowed heads. In sum, the courtroom assumed the appearance
of an overcrowded classroom.
Id. at 754.
'32 Id. at 752. Justice Jackson, in his Krulewitch opinion decades earlier, echoed this view
when he observed that the evidence "will hardly convince one that a trial of this kind is the
highest exemplication of the working ofthe judicial process." Krulewitch, 336 U.S. at 454 n.21
(Jackson, J., concurring).
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In response to the argument that such trials "conserve state funds, diminish
inconvenience . . . and avoid delays,"' he wrote: "We secure greater speed,
economy and convenience in the administration of the law at the price of
fundamental principles of constitutional liberty. That price is too high."'34
3. Particular Difficulties
i. Confessions
Wholly apart from the sorts of broad issues joinder raises, there are many
specific difficulties which arise, some of which are not easily remedied. The most
well known is the so-called Bruton dilemma. More than thirty years ago, in Bruton
v. United States, 35 the Court recognized the traditional principle that the
Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment does not allow ajury, in determining
the guilt or innocence of defendants, to use the incriminating confession of a non-
testifying '6 co-defendant against the other defendants. It was an out-of-court
statement of potentially great significance that identified the other defendants, and
the co-defendant could not be confronted and cross-examined. '37 In Bruton,
however, the Court took the additional and extraordinary step of concluding that a
jury instruction advising the jurors to use the statement only against the confessing
defendant would be insufficient to eliminate the potential Sixth Amendment harm
as to other defendants.' Limiting instructions in this context, therefore, are held
to be constitutionally inadequate."' These confessions can be quite probative,
providing names, dates, and places. How, then, is a prosecutor to deal with a trial
of many defendants, only some of whom confessed and were willing to take the
witness stand to be cross-examined by counsel for co-defendants? The obvious
answer, of course, is to sever on this basis. After all, if the parties are tried
separately, the Bruton problem instantly disappears, as only the defendant's own
statement will be heard by her jury. Granting severance, though, eliminates the
whole point of joinder: bringing the parties together for one trial.
' Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 134 (1968).
'14 People v. Fisher, 164 N.E. 336, 341 (N.Y. 1928) (Lehman, J., dissenting).
'35 391 U.S. 123 (1968).
136 If the person who gave the confession is willing to testify, even if she denies making
the statement, the Confrontation Clause challenge is usually - though not always -
vanquished. See United States v. Sauza-Martinez, 217 F.3d 754,759 (9th Cir. 2000) (stating
that the jury must still get appropriate Bruton limiting charge).
137 Bruton, 391 U.S. at 126.
138 Id. at 123.
'3 Prior to Bruton, courts consistently relied upon the limiting instruction in rejecting
Sixth Amendment attacks. See Delli Paoli v. United States, 352 U.S. 232 (1957), overruled
in part by Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968).
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The agreed-upon solution, used throughout the country, has been to join the
parties, allow the confession to be admitted, give a limiting jury instruction, but also
redact references in the confession to the non-testifying defendants. A simple and
neat solution, one would think. Not exactly. Soon after Bruton, it became apparent
that references in the confession might nevertheless identify individual defendants
even though their names were not actually used. A major line of cases has
developed to determine which sorts of redactions are permissible and which are
not. 4 The problem has become quite complicated and continues to vex the
courts;' 41 it is not so easily solved with the broad notion of redaction.'
ii. Evidence of Other Crimes
State and federal rules of evidence take the consistent position that evidence of
earlier crimes generally is not admissible for the purpose of proving it more likely
that the defendant committed a similar crime as charged. '43 The rules, however, just
as consistently allow such earlier acts to be offered to the jury if they would prove
40 The Supreme Court has found no necessary constitutional violation with the
elimination of references to one defendant, even though the confession may be incriminating
as to that individual. If "neutral" references in the confession are understood by jurors, no
error will be found so long as the understanding results from a link to other proper evidence
presented at trial. Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200 (1987). In Gray v. Maryland, 523 U.S.
185 (1998), however, the Court found a Sixth Amendment violation with the redaction of a
defendant's name with the word "deleted" or a blank space. The differences between the two
opinions are not self-evident. As a consequence, the problem clearly has not been solved. The
amount of litigation and seemingly inconsistent judicial decisions is substantial. Contrast, for
instance, the decision in United States v. Edwards, 159 F.3d 1117 (8th Cir. 1998), with that
in People v. Archer, 99 Cal. Rptr. 2d 230 (Cal. App. 2000).
"'t See generally the discussions in Ex parte Sneed, 783 So. 2d 863 (Ala. 2000)
(determining that the edited statement became incomplete and inconsistent), and United
States v. Edwards, 159 F.3d 1117 (8th Cir. 1998).
142 Indeed, there have been cases - amazingly enough - where "witnesses forg[e]t the[]
Bruton instructions and blurt[] out a codefendant's name instead of replacing it with a neutral
pronoun." Edwards, 159 F.3d at 1127. One court found no error, as the trial judge
"immediately instructed the jury to disregard the blurted testimony, and it twice ordered the
testimony stricken from the record." Id.
"' This is "out of 'fear that the jury will use [such] evidence'.., to convict him of the
charged offense." United States v. Baptiste, 264 F.3d 578, 590 (5th Cir. 2001). See generally
United States v. Lemay, 260 F.3d 1018, 1024-26 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting FED. R. EvID.
404(b), which disallows evidence of prior crimes that are used to prove "the character of a
person in order to show action in conformity therewith"), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1166 (2002).
A few exceptions can be found in both the state and federal systems. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1109
allows, in a prosecution for a charge involving domestic violence, evidence of the
defendant's commission of other acts of domestic violence to show propensity. Rule 414 of
the Federal Rules of Evidence permits a defendant's prior child molestation offenses to be
offered "on any matter to which it is relevant." FED. R. EvID. 414.
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something other than the defendant's propensity to commit this sort of crime.'"
This principle is used often. With such evidence- especially with joint-defendant
trials - serious difficulties can be created for the court and the trial lawyers.""
These include identifying the relevance of the prior acts,'4 6 determining the
probative value of them,'47 giving notice to the defense,' 48 the making of specific
findings,' and the evaluation of the impact of errors in the area. 0
One issue is especially noteworthy with prior acts, for it relates quite directly
to multiple-defendant trials. Jurors must be instructed, if prior acts are admitted,
that such acts may only be considered for particular purposes other than propensity;
such purposes include motive, lack of mistake, and common scheme.' 5 ' These
limiting instructions are seen as extremely important and are normally viewed as
"curative" of any complaints about the introduction of such damaging earlier acts.3 2
Many have openly questioned the ability of jurors to receive such evidence and to
consider it only for the relatively limited purposes directed. 3' Jurors are asked to
"44 United States v. Gricco, 277 F.3d 339, 353 (3d Cir. 2002); United States v. Claxton,
276 F.3d 420 (8th Cir. 2002). The earlier crime must be both similar enough and close
enough in time to the charged crime so as to be relevant. In addition, the value of the earlier
acts must not be outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. United States v. Asher, 178
F.3d 486, 492 (7th Cir. 1999).
41 United States v. Rosenwasser, 550 F.2d 806, 814 (2d Cir. 1977) (Gurfein, J.,
dissenting) ("There are few areas in which it is as important for this court to keep a watchful
eye as on the admissibility of similar offenses in a case involving more than a single
defendant."). See generally United States v. Green, 258 F.3d 683, 693-94 (7th Cir. 2001).
146 See, e.g., United States v. Grimes, 244 F.3d 375 (5th Cir. 2001); United States v.
Schumacher, 238 F.3d 978 (8th Cir. 2001); United States v. Varoudakis, 233 F.3d 113 (1st
Cir. 2000); United States v. Eggleston, 165 F.3d 624, 626 (8th Cir. 1999).
141 United States v. Williams, 238 F.3d 871, 875 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 1073
(2001); United States v. Heath, 188 F.3d 916, 921 (7th Cir. 1999).
148 See United States v. Vega, 188 F.3d 1150 (9th Cir. 1999).
14" See United States v. Mastrangelo, 172 F.3d 288, 295 (3d Cir. 1999).
150 See United States v. Layne, 192 F.3d 556, 573 (6th Cir. 1999); Heath, 188 F.3d at
921-22; State v. Bell, 781 So. 2d 846 (La. 2001).
'5' See FED. R. EVID. 404(b).
152 See, e.g., United States v. Griffin, 194 F.3d 808, 821 (7th Cir. 1999). But see United
States v. Varoudakis, 233 F.3d 113 (1st Cir. 2000).
"' See generally Joel D. Lieberman & Bruce D. Sales, What Social Science Teaches Us
About the Jury Instruction Process, 3 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 589, 600 (1997). The
Arizona Supreme Court now requires that clear and convincing evidence be shown before
prior crimes may be admitted. "Such evidence is quite capable of having an impact beyond
its relevance to the crime charged and may influence the jury's decision on issues other than
those on which it was received, despite cautionary instructions from the judge." People v.
Terrazas, 944 P.2d 1194, 1198 (Ariz. 1997). In Wyoming the trial record must identify, with
specificity: the purpose for the admitted evidence, the relevance of that evidence, and the
manner in which the trial judge determined that the probative value of the evidence
outweighed its prejudicial impact. See Gleason v. State, 57 P.3d 332 (Wyo. 2002). One
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review highly persuasive evidence as to intentionally-committed earlier crimes, yet
to look at the evidence only for a very narrow and specific reason. Indeed, as one
court recently remarked, such evidence "asks jurors to engage in mental gymnastics
that may well be beyond their ability or even their willingness."' 4 That task may
be difficult generally; it may well become monumental when jurors are told, in a
large defendant trial, not only to consider the evidence for a limited purpose, but to
apply the evidence against only one of the many defendants seated before them."'
If the judge decides to permit the prosecutor to introduce evidence of a
co-defendant's uncharged misconduct at a joint trial, the defense faces
a virtual nightmare. At the defendant's trial, the jury may learn of a co-
defendant's uncharged crimes solely because the defendant is standing
trial with the co-defendant. At a paradigmatic trial, a single defendant
may need to be prepared to meet only testimony about the charged
crime. In contrast, when the trial judge allows the prosecution to
introduce evidence of a co-defendant's uncharged misconduct at a joint
trial, the trial becomes several steps removed from the paradigm.5 6
iii. Dealing with Other Defendants and Their Lawyers
In some situations individuals may wish affirmatively to be tried together with
others. There could well be perceived advantages as to cost, development of
investigative resources, and the ability to present a "united front" defense.'57 Of
course, such advantages may quickly disappear when differences develop among
the individuals up to and including the parties presenting antagonistic defenses." 8
thoughtful commentator wrote: "Notwithstanding the judge's limiting instruction on the
proper use of uncharged misconduct evidence, the typical lay juror's common sense may
prompt the juror to fall back on simplistic reasoning that if the defendant did it once, he
probably did it again." Imwinkelried, supra note 4, at 39.
114 United States v. Ward, 190 F.3d 483, 489-90 (6th Cir. 1999).
' The problem is a common one, as evidence of prior acts is often seen in multiple-
defendant trials. See United States v. Morrow, 177 F.3d 272, 290 (5th Cir. 1999). One state
judge recently expressed concern:
[There is the] risk of guilt by association with a codefendant who has a criminal
record, substantial injustice may also result by a jury's confusion of the
evidence. As the record becomes more complex, it becomes more difficult for
the jury to keep the testimony separate as to each codefendant.
State v. Booth, 737 A.2d 404,439 (Conn. 1999) (Berdon, J., dissenting).
156 Imwinkelried, supra note 4, at 39-40.
157 See Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475 (1978).
'58 In Holloway, the trial judge rather casually remarked: "That's all right; let them testify.
There is no conflict of interest. Every time I try more than one person in this court each one
blames it on the other one." Id. at 479. In Krulewitch, Justice Jackson was somewhat more
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In such situations, the attorneys face a dilemma regarding questions of professional
responsibility.' Remedies utilized include severance, mistrial orders, and
appointment of separate counsel. 60
Numerous practical problems in the conduct of the trial can also be seen as to
which defendant's attorney may examine particular witnesses, or even the seating
arrangements for the attorneys and their clients.'6 ' Worse still is the problem of
what the attorney and the client are to do when a lengthy, complex trial has almost
nothing to do with that client.'62
The ultimate nightmare for the defense attorney is the disruptive co-defendant.
Will the non-disruptive defendant look "better" in comparison? Will he look worse
for he, after all, knew the disruptive defendant and undoubtedly had dealings -
even if arguably lawful - with that person?'63 In United States v. Lara,64 the
attorney for Lara tried, to no avail, to have his client unlinked from the co-defendant
Perry, "A/K/A 'King Animal." '65 Lara's attorney moved for severance, 66
mistrial, 67 and a verdict of acquittal. 68 With the appeals court emphasizing the
jurors' ability to follow the instruction that they should not make an adverse
sympathetic to the defense claim: "[I]f, as often happens, co-defendants can be prodded into
accusing or contradicting each other, they convict each other." Krulewitch v. United States,
336 U.S. 440, 454 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring); see also infra note 285 and
accompanying text.
' As in Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60 (1942), where the defense counsel was
required to represent two codefendants whose interests were in conflict. The lawyer's
inability to advocate vigorously for both was "indicative of [his] struggle to serve two
masters." Id. at 75.
' In Holloway, the Supreme Court held that error here would be seen as necessarily
prejudicial. The Court's later rulings as to severance and mistrial orders are something less
stirring.
.6 Not at all a frivolous matter, as in United States v. Ellender, 947 F.2d 748 (5th Cir.
1991), the case in which "[t]he government's aspirations of conducting a megatrial were
limited only by the physical bounds of courtroom walls." Id. at 754.
162 See "Monster "RICO Cases, supra note 4, at 246 (1988) (remarks of Ivan Fisher, Esq.)
("[T]here is this case [in which] two defendants were there for ten months before their names
were ever mentioned, ten months, day in, day out.")
163 As stated in the dissenting opinion in State v. Booth, 737 A.2d 404 (Conn. 1999): "It
is a recognized fact that juries may refuse to believe one defendant is innocent because of his
association with a codefendant who has a substantial criminal record." Id. at 438 (Berdon,
J., dissenting).
'64 181 F.3d 183 (1st Cir. 1999).
165 Id. at 190.
166 Id. at 202 n.7.
167 id.
161 Id. at 200.
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inference from "Perry's gaffe,"'169 Lara's conviction was affirmed. Was Perry's
behavior, his "gaffe," disruptive? One would think that it could well have interfered
with the court proceedings when the defendant Perry "stood up, turned his back to
the jury, unzipped his pants, and urinated on the carpet."'' °
While egregious, Lara is hardly the only example of disruptive behavior by co-
defendants seriously impacting on the ability of an individual to receive a fair
trial. 7' Numerous cases demonstrate that it can be a risky business indeed to be
joined with co-defendants who may have quite different views of how the trial
should go forward. A co-defendant may scream at the trial judge,"' throw things
at others in the court room, 73 threaten a witness,'74 try to communicate with the
jury,77 attempt to escape, 176 or do injury to himself' 77 Each of these cases was
serious, each involved motions to sever, and in each the motions were denied.
Typically the courts dispute the defense claim of prejudice with the view that "a
cautionary instruction advising the jury not to allow a disruptive co-defendant's
behavior to impact the decision regarding other defendants affords sufficient
protection against undue prejudice."'' 7 1 Otherwise, one court wrote, "it might never
169 "[TIhe almost invariable assumption of the law that jurors follow their instructions."
Id. at 202 (quoting Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 206 (1987)).
70 Id. at 202 n.6.
17' This list, of course, excludes disruptions caused by counsel for the co-defendant. See
United States v. Garrett, 961 F.2d 743, 747 n.5 (8th Cir. 1992) (determining that, while
lawyer's actions were extreme and distracting, the court on appeal suggested that such
behavior might have been helpful to the complaining defendant as "it is possible that [the co-
defendant's lawyer's] actions caused the jury to sympathize with Garrett"); see also United
States v. Lumumba, 794 F.2d 806 (2d Cir. 1986) (describing an instance in which a lawyer's
actions were so problematic that he was held in criminal contempt twice).
17 United States v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1227, 1231 (8th Cir. 1978). The defendant yelled in
the court room, calling the proceeding a "kangaroo court." Id. The Eighth Circuit held, on
appeal, that it was sufficient for the trial judge to advise the jury that the "outbursts had
nothing to do with the other defendants and should not be considered in rendering the
verdict." Id.
' United States v. Koskela, 86 F.3d 122, 125 (8th Cir. 1996) (throwing a water pitcher);
United States v. Marshall, 458 F.2d 446 (2d Cir. 1972) (throwing a chair).
'74 United States v. Rocha, 916 F.2d 219, 239 (5th Cir. 1990) (defendant mouthed the
words "you are dead" to a witness); United States v. Mazza, 792 F.2d 1210 (1st Cir. 1986)
(defendant yelled at informant: "He is lying. I got shot for you, you mother piece of shit. This
is my pay back."); United States v. Tashjian, 660 F.2d 829, 837-38 (1st Cir. 1981)
(defendant told witness that he would soon receive five bullets in his head).
17 United States v. Koskela, 86 F.3d 122 (8th Cir. 1996).
176 United States v. Chaussee, 536 F.2d 637 (7th Cir. 1976) (attempting to escape in front
of the jury).
177 United States v. Bamberger, 456 F.2d 1119 (3d Cir. 1972) (swallowing of one of the
government's exhibits by defendant); United States v. Marshall, 458 F.2d446 (2d Cir. 1972)
(cutting of defendant's own wrist with a razor blade).
178 Koskela, 86 F.3d at 125.
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be possible to conclude a trial involving more than one defendant; it would provide
an easy device for defendants to provoke mistrials whenever they might choose to
do so.' '
79
One troubling problem is worth special note here - the coming apart of an
earlier joint defense agreement. This sort of arrangement involves cooperative
efforts - often informal - to uncover and share information prior to trial; it
creates a privilege which is an extension of the attorney-client privilege. The efforts
by counsel pursuant to this plan may include review of documents and grand jury
information. It is problematic typically when one of the defendants, a party to such
an arrangement, reaches a plea bargain, and pursuant to that understanding he
agrees to testify for the government. That is exactly what happened in one recent
case. ' There, counsel for the remaining defendants strenuously argued that earlier
discussions with all of the then-defendants leading to the joint defense pact were
protected by the attorneys' duty of confidentiality, for the earlier agreement
"establishes an implied attorney-client relationship with the co-defendant."'' As-
a consequence, they asserted, the prosecution could not cross-examine the
witness/former co-defendant based on information given during the earlier
privileged meetings and conversations.' 82 Ultimately, counsel moved for a mistrial
and an order permitting withdrawal as counsel.'83
On appeal of the denial of the motions, the court recognized that joint defense
arrangements, hardly a rare occurrence, can "create a disqualifying conflict where
information gained in confidence by an attorney becomes an issue."' The
problems with such agreements are well known. '85 The difficulty in this case was
especially troubling, for the witness's testimony now was in conflict with
statements he had made during those earlier, confidential joint defense meetings. 86
'19 Rocha, 916 F.2d at 230 (quoting Bamberger, 456 F.2d at 1128).
80 United States v. Henke, 222 F.3d 633 (9th Cir. 2000).
Is' Id. at 637.
182 Id. at 637-38.
183 Id. at 637.
184 Id.
185 See, e.g., Walter P. Abraham Constr. Corp. v. Armco Steel Corp., 559 F.2d 250, 253
(5th Cir. 1977):
[A]n attorney should.., not be allowed to proceed against a co-defendant of a
former client wherein the subject matter of the present controversy is
substantially related to the matters in which the attorney was previously
involved, and wherein confidential exchanges ofinformation took place between
the various co-defendants in preparation of a joint defense.
See also Henke, 222 F.3d at 637 (discussing the reasoning in Abraham). See generally
United States v. Hsia, 81 F. Supp. 2d 7 (D.D.C. 2000); United States v. Weissman, 195 F.3d
96 (2d Cir. 1999); United States v. Edwards, 39 F. Supp. 2d 716 (M.D. La. 1999), aff'd, 303
F.3d 606 (5th Cir. 2002); United States v. Sawyer, 878 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1995).
186 Henke, 222 F.3d at 637.
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Thus, to represent their clients effectively, the attorneys should have vigorously
cross-examined the witness, hopefully resulting in the jury hearing of such
discrepancies. To do so, however, would have required divulging confidences
against their earlier "client."'87 Reversing the convictions, the court stressed the
grave questions which can arise fromjoint defense agreements which fly in the face
of the right to be defended by counsel, a "[vital] aspect[] of our criminal justice
system."' 8
4. But the Joinder System Works, Doesn't It?
Problems exist with large multiple-defendant prosecutions; few would deny
that. Still, the response of many judges and lawyers is that the overall process
works well, in a reasonably efficient and fair fashion. In a few important areas,
such a belief seems highly doubtful.
i. Curative Jury Instructions
If problems do arise, jury instructions are seen as curative ofjust about anything
and everything inj oint trials. Ills ranging from evidence to be used against only one
of several defendants,' 89 to the extreme case in which the disruptive defendant's
actions are not to be taken against co-defendants, are thought to be curable through
jury instructions. 9  The Supreme Court often has remarked of "the almost
invariable assumption of the law that jurors follow their instructions."'' To be
sure, it would be "too cynical" to think that a jury would intentionally disobey a
clear instruction on the law by the judge.'92 This view certainly prevails in some
187 Id.
188 Id. at 638. For a thoughtful analysis of the area, see, Craig Lemer, Conspirators'
Privilege and Innocents' Refuge: A New Approach to Joint Defense Agreements, 77 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1449 (2002).
189 See, e.g., United States v. Peterson, 244 F.3d 385, 394 (5th Cir.) (limiting instruction
on bad acts of one defendant not admissible against other defendants), cert. denied sub nom.
O'Keefe v. United States, 534 U.S. 857, cert. denied sub nom. Clark v. United States, 534
U.S. 861 (2001). In United States v. Collazo-Ponte, 216 F.3d 163 (lst Cir. 2000), the court
emphasized the presence of the limiting instruction while writing that "[w]e are well aware
ofthe potential for prejudice in a complicated conspiracy trial involving several defendants."
Id. at 180-81.
190 As in the Lara case discussed above. United States v. Lara, 181 F.3d 183,202 (1 st Cir.
1999); see supra text accompanying notes 164-70.
'' Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 206 (1987).
192 Dawson, supra note 96, at 1405-06. The presumption that jurors follow the instruction
is "rooted less in the absolute certitude that [it] is true than in the belief that it represents a
reasonable practical accommodation of the interests of the state and the defendant in the
criminal justice process." Richardson, 481 U.S. at 211.
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important cases. The use of Miranda violation confessions for impeachment
purposes comes to mind.'93 While jurors are told not to consider the confession as
proof of guilt, they are instructed that the confession may be used to impeach or
discredit the defendant who testifies in a manner inconsistent with that
confession. 1
94
Still, while the law generally follows this "almost invariable assumption" of
such compliance," 5 it is by no means accepted in all situations, especially in large
joint trials. '96 The perfect example, of course, is the co-conspirator confession case,
Bruton, discussed above.'97 In that case, the Supreme Court had a serious question
as to whether, with such a confession, jurors could follow the specific instruction
to use the statement only against the confessing party.' Moreover, the question of
the jurors' ability to adhere to a limiting instruction is far more troubling in the
lengthy and large multiple-defendant prosecutions where such instructions must be
given on numerous occasions, calling the jury's attention to particular items of
evidence to be applied to only one of the many defendants. 9 9 In one case, the
"'s See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1968).
194 Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971).
'9' See, e.g., Richardson, 481 U.S. at 200.
196 For a thorough discussion of the concerns regarding the ability of jurors to follow
instructions and sort evidence in "massive joint trials," see Long Criminal Trials, supra note
4, at 159 (remarks of Judge J. Joseph Smith); Imwinkelried, supra note 4.
7 See supra Part III.3.i.
198 The Court's conclusion, quoting an earlier opinion, is noteworthy:
Unless we proceed on the basis that the jury will follow the court's instructions
where those instructions are clear and the circumstances are such that the jury
can reasonably be expected to follow them, the jury system makes little sense.
We agree that there are many circumstances in which this reliance is justified.
Not every admission of inadmissible hearsay or other evidence can be
considered to be reversible error unavoidable through limiting instructions;
instances occur in almost every trial where inadmissible evidence creeps in,
usually inadvertently. A defendant is entitled to a fair trial but not a perfect one.
It is not unreasonable to conclude that in many such cases the jury can and will
follow the trial judge's instructions to disregard such information. Nevertheless,
... there are some contexts in which the risk that the jury will not, or cannot
follow instructions is so great, and the consequences of failure so vital to the
defendant, that the practical and human limitations of the jury system cannot be
ignored. Such a context is presented here, where the powerfully incriminating
extrajudicial statements of a codefendant, who stands accused side-by-side with
the defendant, are deliberately spread before the jury in a joint trial.
Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 135-36 (1968).
9 Though even in smaller cases it can be a problem, as in United States v. Edwards, 159
F.3d 1117 (8th Cir. 1998), where - in a Bruton situation - witnesses forgot the instructions
and "blurted out a codefendant's name instead of replacing it with a neutral pronoun." Id. at
1127. The court ruled that there was no prejudice, and the jury was instructed to disregard
the blurted out testimony. Id.; see also supra note 142 and accompanying text.
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defendants complained because the judge gave nearly two hundred limiting
instructions, many of which were repeated several times."' It is difficult indeed not
to share Justice Jackson's view that in large joint-defendant cases, not just Bruton
situations, the notion that such limiting instructions will necessarily eliminate
prejudice is an "unmitigated fiction." '0'
ii. Differentiated Verdicts
The lore - and the law - regarding the ability of juries to differentiate items
of evidence and to distinguish among defendants, even in large joint trials, is well
known and settled. The routine goes something like this:
(1) Jurors can carefully sort evidence - some admissible, some not - among
various defendants in the mega-trials.
(2) Jurors do just such sorting and distinguishing among defendants.
(3) These distinctions are validly based in the evidence.
(4) Verdicts that state guilt for some defendants, but not for others, and on
some counts, but not on others, demonstrate the validity of points (1), (2),
and (3).
One must concede much of the essence contained in points (1) and (2). Jurors
often can understand the evidentiary differences set forth in a trial, even with joint
defendants; in theirjudgments, the jurors often draw proper distinctions. Whether
one can argue that this always occurs, however, is highly doubtful. We are trained
to believe that jurors will attempt diligently to follow instructions and make these
important distinctions. How do we know, however, that they get the decisions
right? That these distinctions, as set forth in point (3), really are validly based in
the evidence? Of course, we do not know and we cannot know. Moreover, point
(4) hardly proves anything at all. And, the judicial statements indicating verdict
differentiation as settling the argument most assuredly do not settle the argument.
Judges certainly seem convinced of the power of this verdict differentiation;
they repeatedly refer to it. Some examples of this tendency include:
(1) "When a defendant presses a plausible claim of spillover effect,
differentiated verdicts often constitute tangible evidence of the jury's
enduring ability to distinguish between the culpability of codefendants."202
(2) "We have held that in a multi-defendant case, a mix of guilty and not guilty
200 United States v. Baker, 10 F.3d 1374, 1388 (9th Cir. 1993); see also United States v.
Casamento, 887 F.2d 1141 (2d Cir. 1989). In Casamento, the jury was instructed on
numerous occasions as to evidence admissible against some, but not all, of the defendants.
The trial, with twenty-one defendants, lasted more than seventeen months and involved the
introduction of thousands of exhibits and the testimony of more than 275 witnesses. Id. at
1149. See generally Imwinkelried, supra note 4, at 49-50.
20 Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440,453 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring).
202 United States v. Lara, 181 F.3d 183, 202 (1st Cir. 1999).
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verdicts is some indication that thejury was able to sift through voluminous
evidence and differentiate among various defendants. 20 3
(3) "[Partial acquittal of a defendant in multi-defendant trial] is a strong
indication - that there was no prejudicial 'spillover' of evidence."'20 4
(4) "The best evidence of the jury's ability to compartmentalize the evidence
is its failure to convict all defendants on all counts.' 0 5
Differentiating verdicts do not necessarily prove that jurors understood the
evidence fully and made measured judgments as to guilt. Such verdicts merely
demonstrate that the jury did not simply issue one blanket determination on every
defendant and on every charge. But, does that mean that this determination was the
correct one as to every person and every charge? Is it not just as plausible, for
instance, that with thejoinder of defendants and charges, a minor figure might well
have been convicted of something, perhaps in the form of compromise? Had she
been tried separately, perhaps she would have been wholly acquitted.0 6 Moreover,
looking for relief on appeal will not be satisfying. The consideration of such a
question by appellate judges is given light treatment if there is evidence in the
record which would support the jury's decision.2
To be sure, if one has doubt as to the validity of the argument in connection
with multi-defendant trials generally, that doubt must be heightened tremendously
with large trials. Multi-defendant criminal cases, as seen previously, can involve
enormous numbers of defendants, continue for several months, and at times require
the jury to consider literally thousands of documents and the testimony of hundreds
of witnesses. 0" These concerns are even more acute in the sort of prosecution in
which one defendant is - from the outset - viewed as a minor figure with only
slight connection to the major conspirators.' 9 While she may have minimal
involvement, she can be joined with the others for trial in a distant location and the
burden on her to defend will be tremendous."' When the evidence is overwhelming
against "the group," she has a very difficult position to occupy. Will the jury lump
203 Casamento, 887 F.2d at 1150.
204 United States v. Garcia, 848 F.2d 1324, 1334 (2d Cir. 1988); see also United States
v. Solis, 299 F.3d 420, 441 (5th Cir. 2002).
205 United States v. Unruh, 855 F.2d 1363, 1374 (9th Cir. 1987); see also United States
v. Gravatt, 280 F.3d 1189, 1191 (8th Cir. 2002).
"0 Dawson, supra note 96, at 1405.
207 See United States v. Koskela, 86 F.3d 1122 (8th Cir. 1996); United States v. Tashjian,
660 F.2d 829 (1st Cir. 1981).
208 See, e.g., cases cited supra note 100.
209 See supra note 9.
2 0 The point was recognized by the Supreme Court in Zafiro v. United States, 506 U.S.
534 (1993). While the Court in Zafiro was not at all generous as to the granting of severance,
it did express some concern for this type of defendant. "When many defendants are tried
together in a complex case and they have markedly different degrees of culpability, [the] risk
of prejudice is heightened." Id. at 539.
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her together with the others - the "birds of a feather" conclusion?"' Or, will the
jury decide that she stands alone (though she sits together with the others) and is not
a part of the scheming conspirators?" 2 An experienced person in this field will be
hard pressed to state that the differentiating verdict necessarily means that the jury
"got it right" on all counts as to that minor figure and as to all of the other
defendants as well.2 1
3
iii. Let's Not Forget the Savings
If one could conclude that the difficulties presented by big joint-defendant trials
were balanced by important countervailing considerations, then such trials could
perhaps be viewed as justified." 4 Courts repeatedly discuss the benefits of joint-
defendant trials.
(1) Legislators in allowing for joinder have "recognized the utility of multi-
defendant trials to effectuate the prompt efficient disposition of criminal
justice." '
(2) "The obvious advantage of ajoint criminal trial of several defendants under
a single conspiracy allegation is the avoidance of separate trials inuring to
the benefit of the overall administration of justice."2'1 6
(3) Multi-defendant trials promote efficiency and minimize the chance of
inconsistent verdicts. 217
(4) These trials allow witnesses to avoid the burden of successive trials. 218
While these purported advantages in a routine case may be more illusory than
actual, 21 9 even if one were to accept them as necessarily correct, they still do not
demonstrate the importance of having huge multiple-defendant trials. That is, few
would argue for a rule of absolute severance requiring, for example, three trials for
three separate defendants when there is little serious risk of great prejudice in the
routine case.220 With the advent of the mega-trial, and the trial of a dozen or more
defendants, however, the calculation is quite different.
211 As suggested by Justice Jackson. See supra text accompanying note 201.
212 See United States v. Glinton, 154 F.3d 1245, 1250 (11 th Cir. 1998).
213 See generally "Monster" RICO Cases, supra note 4, at 243-47 (remarks of Ivan
Fisher).
214 Though the admonition of Judge Lehman still rings in the ears. See supra text
accompanying note 134.
211 United States v. Davenport, 935 F.2d 1223, 1236 (11 th Cir. 1991).
216 Glinton, 154 F.3d at 1250.
217 Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 209-10 (1987).
218 United States v. Cohen, 145 F.2d 82, 91 (2d Cir. 1944).
219 See supra Part 111.2.
220 And, I am not such a person. See infra text accompanying notes 333-37.
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To prove the point, consider again United States v. Baker.2 ' The prosecution
there was remarkable in its scope, alas it is hardly unique.222 The fifteen defendants
went to trial (three reached plea agreements during the trial) for a variety of drug
offenses. 223 The trial, according to the Ninth Circuit, raised questions as to the
"practical and human limitations of our jury system itself, 224 "challeng[ing] the
most fundamental goals of our federal criminal justice system: 'simplicity in
procedure, fairness in administration and the elimination of unjustifiable expense
and delay.' ' 225 The trial took more than sixteen months, produced over thirty
thousand pages of transcripts, involved 250 witnesses and thousands of exhibits.226
The evidence indicated over two thousand narcotics transactions in an eleven-year
period. 227  The government argued strenuously that such a mega-trial was
appropriate.228 The court was not persuaded and set out in some detail its response
to the particular assertions raised by the United States:
(1) Joint trials save time and serve judicial economy.
"Ludicrous," the court found separate trials would have been far more
economical. With the experience of shorter trials in the same basic subject area, the
trial judge can move more rapidly, and the prosecutors' presentations are "sharper
and more streamlined ... so that '[e]ach successive trial moves at a quicker and
smoother pace than the last.' ' 229
(2) Problems in prosecuting later tried defendants.
With separate trials, the government's case will be weakened because later-tried
defendants will be aware of more of the government's strategy and evidence. Not
so, wrote the court: "Disclosure of the government's method and quality of proof
may even benefit the prosecution by inducing additional guilty pleas from severed
defendants. 230 And, if the difficulty is so great, why has the problem not been seen
where the government must retry a case reversed on appeal, "a situation in which
the government has proved fully capable of securing convictions?"2 ''
221 10 F.3d 1374 (9th Cir. 1993).
222 See supra text accompanying note 108.
223 Baker, 10 F.3d at 1386.
224 id.
225 Id. at 1392 (quoting FED. R. CRiM. P. 2).
226 Id. at 1386.
227 Id.
228 Id. at 1390.
229 Baker, 10 F.3d at 1389. In addition, "[w]ith fewer defendants and defense counsel
involved, there is less need for the sidebars and continuances that contribute to the length of
a joint trial." Id.
230 Id. at 1390. This point was made forcefully in United States v. Gallo, 668 F. Supp. 736,
757 (E.D.N.Y. 1987).
231 Baker, 10 F.3d at 1390.
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(3) The need to avoid inconsistent verdicts.
Not a significant concern, wrote the judges. While the court conceded that
inconsistent verdicts "may appear unfair and undermine public confidence in the
judicial system," '232 the appeals judges were not at all sure why the difficulty is
greater with severed trials than it would be in one trial where some defendants are
convicted of some counts while others are not. Moreover, inconsistent verdicts are
no more likely in separate trials than in a joint trial.233
(4) Witnesses will be intimidated or become reluctant to testify again.
This was the government's strongest argument, though here too the court was
not moved, for the judges could not understand why the problem would be greater
in separate trials than in a joint trial, "where, as here, the defendants know the
identity of most of the government's witnesses far in advance." '234 In any case, if the
issue should arise, the "possible loss of testimony and, more importantly, risk to the
lives of witnesses must be factored into the equation on a case-by-case basis." '235
Government concerns about severed trials, and the "questionable benefits" of
the joint trial did not persuade the Baker court.236 Recognition of the "indisputable
staggering hardships" of this mammoth trial did. 7
The first hardship recognized by the court was the risk of real harm to the
defendants, which "increases sharply with the number of defendants and the length
of the trial." '38 Defendants must be present in court at all times, enduring "months
or even years of incarceration while they are presumed, and may in fact turn out to
be, innocent." '239 Defendants may not be able to secure the lawyer of choice due to
232 Id.
233 For example, of the seven defendants charged in the marijuana conspiracy in this
case, four were convicted, one was acquitted, and the district court declared a
mistrial as to the remaining two. We cannot see how the same result occurring
after separate trials would result in any greater "scandal and inequity."
Id. (quoting Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 210 (1987)).
234 Baker, 10 F.3d at 1390.
23. Id. The court also mentioned the probability of preserving testimony of witnesses for
use at subsequent trials under Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(1). Baker, 10 F.3d at 1390. It is hard to
understand the court's reasoning here, for the rule is limited in criminal cases - unlike in
civil actions - to situations in which the defendant was involved directly in the earlier
proceeding.
236 id.
237 Id.
238 id.
239 Id. "The Sixth Amendment speedy trial guarantee is rendered toothless when a verdict
is not returned until years after an indictment." Id. The court focused attention on one
defendant.
Most importantly, the human limitations of the jury system and the consequent
risk of spillover prejudice cannot be ignored. This risk is particularly acute for
comparatively peripheral defendants such as Robert Cole, who was charged only
in the methamphetamine conspiracy count and whose separate trial could have
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the "staggering attorney fees.., or because attorneys are unwilling to suspend the
balance of their practice for such a protracted period."24
Second, the very negative impact on the lawyers involved presents an added
hardship. Counsel may not be able to make an orderly presentation, as they are
often in the awkward situation of calling later witnesses to impeach the credibility
of prosecution witnesses who testified many months earlier. Lawyers for the
defendants can disagree sharply as to trial tactics and strategies. Moreover, the
"tremendous burdens" on both defense and government lawyers cannot be
understated. Another potential hardship deals directly with appointed counsel.
"Appointed defense counsel may sacrifice their time and other practice to earn less
than half of what they normally charge, and the government must commit
experienced prosecutors to a single trial indefinitely."24'
A third hardship recognized by the Baker court is the poor treatment of jurors.
Ordinary citizens are not well served in the large joint trial. The court stated the
matter forcefully: "Jurors have their employment and home life disrupted, often at
great financial, physical, and personal expense. They are required to 'sit stoically
and silently for hours every day, day after day,' and are prohibited from engaging
in many ordinary pursuits of their daily lives, such as reading the newspaper. '242
Finally, such cases may have an adverse impact on both levels of the judiciary.
The trial judge's commitment to one case means that "the administration ofjustice
in all of the court's cases is unconscionably delayed."243 At the trial, if a mistake
by the court is made on a ruling, the judge will be most reluctant to declare a
mistrial." On appeal the impact is just as bad. In Baker transcripts were not filed
until almost one-and-a-half years after trial, and oral argument was not heard until
been concluded in a matter of days or weeks, but who was required to sit in the
courtroom during months of proof involving entirely unrelated conspiracies and
substantive offenses.
Id. at 1391.
240 Id. at 1390. See generally Long Criminal Trials, supra note 4, at 15 7 (remarks ofJudge
J. Joseph Smith).
241 Baker, 10 F.3d at 1391. Noted trial lawyer Edward Bennett Williams remarked, forty
years ago, that "[t]he economic facts of life are such that skilled, competent, able trial lawyers
are shunning these cases, the mass conspiracy multiple defendant, multiple count case."
Long Criminal Trials, supra note 4, at 182-83 (remarks of Edward Bennett Williams, Esq.).
242 Baker, 10 F.3d at 1391 (quoting United States v. Gallo, 668 F. Supp. 736, 754
(E.D.N.Y. 1987)). See generally Long Criminal Trials, supra note 4, at 157-58 (remarks of
Judge J. Joseph Smith).
243 Baker, 10 F.3d at 1391 (quoting Gallo, 668 F. Supp. at 755).
244 "The pressure to avoid a mistrial or reversal may also affect evidentiary rulings. 'The
option of a mistrial and a restarting of the case is almost closed when such a large
expenditure of time and effort would be wasted."' Id. at 1391 (quoting Gallo, 668 F. Supp.
at 755).
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almost four years after the conclusion of the trial.245
From the court's analysis in Baker, one should be reluctant indeed to trumpet
the values of the large joint trial while discounting the negative impact of it in so
many areas. Largejoint trials are expensive, difficult, and not necessarily beneficial
to any one party.246 The financial investment in such a case is staggering.247 The
time commitments are onerous. 48 The ability of the jurors to follow the flow of the
case is greatly compromised.249 And, surely to the chagrin of champions of the
245 The court was clearly upset with the burden placed upon it:
The difficulties in coordinating briefing schedules and oral argument, the
practical impossibility of a thorough review of the record, and the strain on
judges and court clerks from reading the "briefs" (over 1200 pages in this
appeal) make it more difficult fully to consider the issues raised and significantly
burden our already congested calendar.
Baker, 10 F.3d at 1391.
24 For an excellent discussion, see Long Criminal Trials, supra note 4, at 161-62
(remarks of Judge Edward Weinfeld).
247 The Ninth Circuit described the financial investment as follows:
Finally, we are abundantly aware that it is the taxpayers who frequently foot the
bill for an extended criminal trial. The legal fees of defense attorneys appointed
under the Criminal Justice Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3006A (1988), exceeded $2 million.
Counsel for Robert Cole, whose separate trial we believe could have been
concluded in a couple of weeks, filed over $250,000 in CJA vouchers during the
joint trial. An additional $550,000 in appointed defense counsel fees have been
paid on this appeal to the date of oral argument. When these millions of dollars
in defense costs are combined with the millions in prosecution and court costs
(including extensive reconstruction of the courtroom to accommodate the large
number of defendants), the price tag of these 12 convictions is virtually
indefensible.
Baker, 10 F.3d at 1392.
248 "We do not believe that this case would have required 16 months in the courtroom had
the defendants been tried in manageable groups of three or four." Id. at 1390.
249 At oral argument in this case, the Assistant United States Attorney averred that
his multiple violations of the district court's limiting instructions during closing
argument were the inadvertent result of confusion. When a seasoned prosecutor
is unable to keep track of nearly 200 limiting instructions given over the course
of a 16-month trial, our faith in a lay jury's ability to do so is stretched to the
limit. Our presumption that a jury is able to follow the trial court's instructions
is "rooted less in the absolute certitude that the presumption is true than in the
belief that it represents a reasonable practical accommodation of the interests of
the state and the defendant in the criminal justice process." The presumption is
not irrebuttable.
Id. at 1391 (quoting Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 211 (1987)). As stated by trial
lawyer Williams:
The great problem confronting the district judge is one of trial management. The
jury must constantly be made aware of the fact that there are separate individuals
on trial and that each must be judged solely on the evidence properly admissible
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large j oint-defendant trial, appeals courts now more frequently question the claims
that no prejudicial is being present in such a colossal undertaking.25°
iv. Current Remedies
In considering the remedies available for problems in connection with large
joint trials, let us return to the illustration presented earlier - the wide-ranging
conspiracy involving the importation, distribution, and exportation of illegal
narcotics."' Twenty defendants, in twenty cities, have been charged as participants
in this scheme. Venue, as noted previously, likely would be proper in any one of
the twenty cities in which the twenty actors are domiciled.252 The mere fact that
some of the twenty individuals were not major players, or were not fully aware of
the broad nature of the plan, would not defeat the government's venue assertion.253
Recall, that in discussing the problems with venue, we saw that a remedy was in
fact present which could lessen greatly the problems created by liberal venue
rules. 4 A trial judge has the power to order a transfer of a case to another, more
convenient place, even though venue had been properly set in her district or city.255
against him." How can you cope with this problem? This is a problem that
plagues defense counsel in the trial of a multi-defendant, multi-offense case,
because at the end of the case, when a great morass of evidence has been
dumped before the jury and hundreds of exhibits have gone before them, there
is a tendency for the jury to look at the defendants as all tarred with the same
brush and not to eliminate and distinguish between them.
Long Criminal Trials, supra note 4, at 186 (remarks of Edward Bennett Williams).
250 The government also takes on a significant risk of reversal on appeal, not only
as a result of the prejudice of such an epic trial, but because of any number of
evidentiary or instructional errors that occur in the most basic proceedings. Even
the most fair and attentive trial judge will err during the course of a 16-month
trial, and some of those errors may require reversal.
Baker, 10 F.3d at 1391.
251 See supra text accompanying notes 53-54.
252 See supra Part III.A.
253 This holds true as well for convictions as co-conspirators. As discussed in United
States v. Pedrick, 181 F.3d 1264 (1 1th Cir. 1999):
[A] conspirator is not required to participate in all aspects of a conspiracy and
may be convicted as a co-conspirator or even an aider and abettor if she
participates in some affirmative conduct designed to aid the success of the
venture with knowledge that her actions would further the venture. Indeed, the
evidence need not show that each defendant knew of each phase of the
conspiracy, all of its details, all of the conspirators, or the participants in each
event.
Id. at 1272 (citations omitted).
254 See supra notes 65-67 and accompanying text.
255 Under the usual transfer rules, as in FED. R.CRIM. P. 2 1(b).
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Alas, this possible remedy is far from reality. Fewjudges order such transfers, even
in cases which seem to cry out for movement of the large multiple-defendant
criminal trial.256
The situation is strikingly similar with joinder of parties. Individuals may be
joined together if it is alleged 57 that they participated in a large operation, even at
a fairly minor level. Serious problems associated with that charging process have
been identified. Once more, a clear remedy appears to be available to trial judges,
and yet again, judges rarely employ it.
Let us assume the joinder of our twenty defendants for purposes of the trial. If
the joinder creates problems, the trial judge in either a state or federal jurisdiction
may order the severance of some of those defendants into smaller, more manageable
groupings for the purpose of later proceedings. As one former prosecuting attorney
once said, "[the system] give[s] the judges all of the capability in the world to limit
these trials and to prepare for them and to conduct them in a fair and efficient
way." '258 That is correct. Under the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, a judge
may sever a trial "[i]f it appears that a defendant.. . is prejudiced by a joinder of
offenses or of defendants."259 With a strong preference for joint trials and a clear
presumption against severance,2 6' however, trial judges do not often utilize this
remedy.
Following the direction of the United States Supreme Court, one sees state
supreme courts,161 federal 262 and state263 courts of appeal, and trial judges6 4
routinely reject motions" for severance. They understand that "[t]here is a
preference . . . for joint trials of defendants who are indicted together, ' 265 a
"preference ... particularly strong where ... the defendants are alleged to have
256 See supra text accompanying notes 78-90.
257 The facts supporting the joinder need not be shown at trial, only charged in the
indictment. See Schaffer v. United States, 362 U.S. 511 (1960).
258 "Monster" RICO Cases, supra note 4, at 236 (remarks of Louis Freeh).
259 FED. R. CRIM P. 14. The state rules are similar. See, e.g., D.C. CODE ANN. § 23-313
(2000); LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 495.1 (West 2000); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. 174.165
(Michie 200 1), S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23A-l 1-2 (Michie 200 1).
260 The point is emphasized repeatedly in Fed. Bar Council Comm., supra note 4.
261 See, e.g., State v. Booth, 737 A.2d 404 (Conn. 1999).
262 See, e.g., United States v. Carbajal, 290 F.3d 277, 289 n.20 (5th Cir. 2002); United
States v. Hart, 273 F.3d 363, 370 (3d Cir. 2001); United States v. Novaton, 271 F.3d 968,
989 (1 Ith Cir. 2001); United States v. Pierro, 32 F.3d 611 (1st Cir. 1994).
263 See, e.g., State v. Brooks, 758 So. 2d 814, 821 (La. App. 1999) ("Whether to grant or
deny a severance is within the sound discretion of the trial court, and the court's decision will
not be disturbed absent clear abuse of that discretion.").
264 See, e.g., United States v. Aiken, 76 F. Supp. 2d 1346 (S.D. Fla. 1999); United States
v. Volpe, 42 F. Supp. 2d 204 (E.D.N.Y. 1999); United States v. Bodie, 990 F Supp. 1419
(S.D. Fla. 1997).
265 Zafiro v. United States, 506 U.S. 534, 537 (1993).
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participated in a common plan or scheme. 266 The general rule is that persons
indicted together should be tried together, "particularly in conspiracy cases."2 67
"Rarely, if ever, will it be improper for co-conspirators to be tried together." 268 To
have a severance motion granted, a defendant must demonstrate "that a miscarriage
of justice looms, 2 69 that "he could not have a fair trial without severance. '270 It is
not enough to show that the evidence against co-defendants is far more powerful
than against the defendant in question,27' or that a large and lengthy trial will spend
little time on the evidence against him.272 To the contrary, in virtually all
jurisdictions, trial judges appear to believe that one of two conditions must be
present before they will be willing to act. In the words of the United States
Supreme Court, "[a trial judge] should grant a severance ... only if there is a
serious risk that a joint trial would compromise a specific trial right of one of the
defendants, or prevent the jury from making a reliable judgment about guilt or
innocence." '273
On the latter point, we have already seen a deep reluctance to conclude that
joinder will affect a reliable judgment, even in cases involving enormous amounts
of evidence, large numbers of defendants, and extremely lengthy proceedings.274
On the former point, it is hard to imagine what such a specific trial right could be.
Unless something foolish is seen - such as an undue restriction on the ability of
a defense attorney to examine a particular witness, or improper limitations on the
time for argument - specific trial rights are not the issue regarding severance in
these trials.
The real problem here is not the specific trial rights. Instead, it is an
atmosphere of confusion, generated by a production-line type of proceeding which
can lead to dissension, conflict, confusion, and serious questions of fairness.
Indeed, the one claim of a specific trial right in this area, which has been vigorou sly
asserted, has failed miserably before most courts. The reference here is to the jury
hearing evidence and arguments of one defendant which directly conflict with the
evidence and arguments of another - the antagonistic defenses.
266 United States v. Salameh, 152 F.3d 88, 115 (2d Cir. 1998).
267 United States v. Pedrick, 181 F.3d 4264, 1272 (11 th Cir. 1999).
268 United States v. Frazier, 274 F.3d 1185, 1194 (8th Cir. 200 1); United States v. Davis,
154 F.3d 772, 781 (8th Cir. 1998).
269 United States v. LiCausi, 167 F.3d 36, 49 (1st Cir. 1999).
270 United States v. Robbins, 197 F.3d 829, 841 (7th Cir. 1999).
27, This is so even if co-defendants are indicted on many more counts than the defendant
at issue. See United States v. Mathison, 157 F.3d 541, 546 (8th Cir. 1998).
272 See United States v. Eads, 191 F.3d 1206, 1209 (10th Cir. 1999) (noting that the
evidence dealing with the defendant's participation in the conspiracy ended by the second
day of twelve-day trial).
273 Zafiro v. United States, 506 U.S. 534, 539 (1993).
274 See supra text accompanying notes 215-18.
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Showing that antagonistic defenses might cause sufficient harm is painfully
difficult. Having a court accept the notion that the differing defenses are even
antagonistic is quite a chore itself. Conflicting arguments by counsel2 75 and mere
inconsistencies in evidence and testimony are insufficient.2 76  So too is
"fingerpointing."2" The defense attorney must show that the defendants are on an
evidentiary "collision course." ' 8 Few cases are reported in which antagonistic
defenses have persuaded judges at trial279  or on appeal 20  that
275 United States v. Davis, 170 F.3d 617, 621 (6th Cir. 1999).
276 United States v. Volpe, 42 F. Supp. 2d 204, 210-11 (E.D.N.Y. 1999).
277 United States v. Voigt, 89 F.3d 1050, 1095 (3d Cir. 1996); United States v. Arruda,
715 F.2d 671, 679 (1st Cir. 1983).
278 As most notably stated in one of the Watergate appeals, United States v. Haldeman,
559 F.2d 31, 71 (D.C. Cir. 1976). See generally United States v. Angwin, 263 F.3d 979,
987-88 (9th Cir.), amended, 271 F.3d 786 (9th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 966
(2002).
279 One important exception is the Oklahoma City bombing prosecution. United States v.
McVeigh, 169 F.R.D. 362 (D. Colo. 1996). The thoughtful comments of a concerned trial
judge regarding this matter are worth pondering:
Both defendants seek severance on the ground that their defenses are so
antagonistic as to prevent a fair joint trial. The Supreme Court limited the use of
antagonistic defenses as a basis for severance, holding that there is no per se rule
of severance. More than mere "finger pointing" is required .... While the
defenses of these two men may not fully meet the mutually exclusive standard,
there will be substantial and significant differences in the tactical approaches
taken by their respective counsel. At times they will have different positions on
evidentiary objections, and different approaches to the cross-examination of the
government's witnesses and in the presentation of defense witnesses ...
Preference for a joint trial of persons charged with conspiracy and with aiding
and abetting crimes assume efficiencies resulting in conservation of resources,
reduction in inconveniences to witnesses and public authorities, avoidance of
delays and mitigation of adverse effects on witnesses and victims. Such
assumptions must be analyzed for their validity in any particular case and their
value may be outweighed by the compelling interest in the fairness and finality
of the verdict .... There are efficiencies and advantages in single focused trials.
The time needed for jury selection is significantly reduced: the number of
defense peremptory challenges is halved and only one defense counsel conducts
voir dire questioning. It is easier to apply the rules of evidence when there is a
trial of one defendant, particularly with regard to the admissibility of statements
offered under Rule 801(d)(2); character evidence under Rule 404(a)(1) and
proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge and identity
under Rule 404(b). Given these considerations, it is far from certain that the time
required for two separate trials would, in total, be substantially greater than the
time required for a joint trial....
Id. at 370; see also United States v. Williams, 181 F. Supp. 2d 267, 301 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
20 It will take the extreme situation where, in effect, a defense lawyer becomes "a second
prosecutor [who iun order to zealously represent his client [does] everything possible to
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substantive rights would be violated with the presence of antagonistic defenses.
This result should hardly be surprising considering the astonishingly narrow
view taken by the United States Supreme Court. In Zafiro v. United States,28" ' the
Court emphasized the "preference in the federal system forj oint trials of defendants
who are indicted together." '282 With that proposition in mind, its view of
antagonistic defenses becomes predictable: "Mutually antagonistic defenses are not
prejudicial per se."283 While the Court conceded that prejudice could possibly be
shown in cases in which so many defendants are being tried that the complexity of
the prosecution and the presence of antagonistic defenses would lead to juror
confusion,284 it is rare indeed for a trial judge to find such a situation.285 As one
court stated, severance is required only if "the jury will infer that both defendants
are guilty solely because of the conflict.""2 6
convict the other defendant." United States v. Tootick, 952 F.2d 1078, 1082 (9th Cir. 1991).
But see United States v. Romanello, 726 F.2d 173, 174 (5th Cir. 1984). See generally United
States v. Evans, 272 F.3d 1069, 1084 (8th Cir. 2001).
The joint trial of conspiracy defendants was originally deemed useful to prove
that the parties planned their crimes together. However, it has become a powerful
tool for the government to prove substantive crimes and to cast guilt upon a host
of co-defendants. In this case, we are concerned with the specific prejudice that
results when defendants become weapons against each other, clawing into each
other with antagonistic defenses. Like the wretches in Dante's hell, they may
become entangled and ultimately fuse together in the eyes of the jury, so that
neither defense is believed and all defendants are convicted. Under such
circumstances, the trial judge abuses its discretion in failing to sever the trials of
the co-defendants.
Romanello, 726 F.2d at 174.
28' 506 U.S. 534 (1993).
282 Id. at 537.
283 Id. at 538.
284 Even so, severance would not necessarily be the remedy, according to the Court, for
the Rule "leaves the tailoring of the relief to be granted, if any, to the district court's sound
discretion." Id. at 539.
28. See Imwinkelried, supra note 4, at 36 ("As a practical matter, Zafiro has made it
exceedingly difficult for a defendant to persuade a trial judge to grant a severance motion,
especially in conspiracyprosecutions.") For an incisive discussion ofthe problem, see United
States v. Mayfield, 189 F.3d 895 (9th Cir. 1999), in which the court wrote that Zafiro "rejects
a per se rule [and finds] severance may be required because the inconsistent defenses suggest
a heightened risk of prejudice." Id. at 904.
286 United States v. Caporale, 806 F.2d 1487, 1510 (11th Cir. 1986). The process for
evaluation was laid out in Williams v. Singletary, 114 F.3d 177 (1 1th Cir. 1997). Four
questions must be answered:
(1) Do the alleged conflicts with co-defendants' defenses go to the essence of the
appellant's defense?
(2) Could the jury reasonably construct a sequence of events that accommodates
the essence of both defendants' defenses?
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A showing, then, of antagonistic defenses is not likely to persuade a trial judge
that severance should be granted to avoid "compromis[ing] a specific trial right." '287
(3) Did the conflict subject the appellant to compelling prejudice?
(4) Could the trial judge ameliorate the prejudice?
Id. at 179. Justice Steven's concurring opinion in Zafiro - harkening back to the words of
Justice Jackson in Krulewitch - is a far more careful balancing of the concerns that the
majority of the Court should have considered regarding antagonistic defenses:
I would save for another day evaluation of the prejudice that may arise when the
evidence or testimony offered by one defendant is truly irreconcilable with the
innocence of a codefendant. Because the facts here do not present the issue
squarely, I hesitate in this case to develop a rule that would govern the very
different situation faced in cases ... in which mutually exclusive defenses
transform a trial into "more of a contest between the defendants than between the
people and the defendants." Under such circumstances, joinder may well be
highly prejudicial, particularly when the prosecutor's own case in chief is
marginal and the decisive evidence of guilt is left to be provided by a
codefendant. The burden of overcoming any individual defendant's presumption
of innocence, by proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, rests solely on the
shoulders of the prosecutor. Joinder is problematic in cases involving mutually
antagonistic defenses because it may operate to reduce the burden on the
prosecutor, in two general ways. First, joinder may introduce what is in effect a
second prosecutor into a case, by turning each codefendant into the other's most
forceful adversary. Second, joinder may invite a jury confronted with two
defendants, at least one of which is almost certainly guilty, to convict the
defendant who appears the more guilty of the two regardless of whether the
prosecutor has proven guilt beyond a reasonable doubt as to that particular
defendant. Though the Court is surely correct that this second risk may be
minimized by careful instructions insisting on separate consideration of the
evidence as to each codefendant, the danger will remain relevant to the prejudice
inquiry in some cases. Given these concerns, I cannot share the Court's
enthusiastic and unqualified "preference" for the joint trial of defendants
indicted together .... There will, however, almost certainly be multidefendant
cases in which a series of separate trials would be not only more reliable, but
also more efficient and manageable than some of the mammoth conspiracy cases
which the Government often elects to prosecute. And in all cases, the Court
should be mindful of the serious risks of prejudice and overreaching that are
characteristic ofjoint trials, particularly when a conspiracy count is included in
the indictment.... I agree with the Court that a "bright-line rule, mandating
severance whenever codefendants have conflicting defenses" is unwarranted. For
the reasons discussed above, however, I think district courts must retain their
traditional discretion to consider severance whenever mutually antagonistic
defenses are presented. Accordingly, I would refrain from announcing a
preference for joint trials, or any general rule that might be construed as a limit
on that discretion.
Zafiro v. United States, 506 U.S. 534, 543-45 (1993) (Stevens, J. concurring) (citations
omitted).
287 Id. at 539.
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On appeal, too, those defendants relying on severance arguments - even with
antagonistic defenses present - generally fare poorly. The severance question is
placed in the discretion of the trial judge,2 8 and the exercise of that discretion is
virtually unreviewable.2 89 Even if an abuse of discretion - or in the words of some
courts, a clear abuse290 - occurs, the defendant on appeal will prevail only if she
can show that the denial of the motion to sever resulted in "manifest prejudice."29'
While the hurdle may not be entirely unsurmountable,292 it is extremely difficult for
the defense.
With few possible remedies available in the area of these large joint-defendant
trials, we find ourselves in a curious situation. Judges regularly and somewhat
routinely decry the problems with such trials. It is not at all unusual to find this sort
of statement: "A long and complex trial like this one taxes the patience and vigor
of the judge, jury, and counsel." '293 At the same time, the very judges who
pronounce such concerns regularly and routinely either deny motions for severance
or uphold such rulings on appeal.294
Three principal reasons explain this seeming anomaly. First, as discussed
above, there is the widespread notion - stated most forcefully by the United States
Supreme Court - that as a general matter these large trials really do work; they are
economically sound with little risk of harm to defendants.29 This statement in
Richardson v. Marsh has been relied upon in many cases:
It would impair both the efficiency and the fairness of the criminal justice
system to require . . . that prosecutors bring separate proceedings,
presenting the same evidence again and again, requiring victims and
witnesses to repeat the inconvenience (and sometimes trauma) of testifying,
and randomly favoring the last-tried defendants who have the advantage of
knowing the prosecution's case beforehand.296
Apart from the fact that the statement here was utterly gratuitous, 97 no one has ever
288 See United States v. Gbemisola, 225 F.3d 753, 760-61 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
289 United States v. Salameh, 152 F.3d 88, 115 (2d Cir. 1998) (quoting United States v.
Lasanto, 978 F.2d 1300, 1306 (2d Cir. 1992)).
290 See United States v. Pedrick, 181 F.3d 1264, 1272 (11 th Cir. 1999).
29 State v. Booth, 737 A.2d 404,415 (Conn. 1999). See also Salameh, 152 F.3d at 115,
wherein the court - relying on well established precedent - wrote that the defense will
succeed on appeal only if the prejudice shown is "so severe that his conviction constituted
a miscarriage of justice... prejudice so great as to deny him a fair trial ... ." Id. See
generally United States v. Phillips, 239 F.3d 829 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 884, cert.
denied sub nom. Stork v. United States, 534 U.S. 967 (2001).
292 See supra notes 279-80 and accompanying text.
2" United States v. Posada-Rios, 158 F.3d 832, 865 (5th Cir. 1998).
294 See id.
"9 See Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 210 (1987).
296 Id.
297 In Richardson, the Court was dealing with a two-person prosecution, not a twenty-two-
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offered empirical support for this cost-saving rationale. Indeed, in spite of the
conclusion that these large trials "by and large.., promote [] judicial efficiency, '2 9
as indicated earlier, in many cases the evidence seems quite to the contrary.
29
Second, there is the somewhat surprising rationale that, in many cases, if it is
not a "clean sweep" of guilty verdicts for all defendants on all charges that must
mean jurors were able to act in a fair and consistent fashion. This point is made
often.3"' Once again, the support for such a conclusion is wanting, and indeed none
is ever seriously offered. And, as noted earlier,"' one could argue forcefully that
such split verdicts prove nothing - not juror understanding, not juror confusion.
They are what they are, verdicts in cases in which neither the government nor the
defense was entirely successful.
Third, judges truly do seem to believe that even if problems exist in these trials,
particularly with evidentiary matters, instructions to the jury will cure them.302 How
does one take this argument seriously? No doubt in small, short trials, jurors may
be able to follow the directions from the trial court.30 3 But in a case involving more
than a dozen defendants? In a trial taking a year? In a prosecution with hundreds
or even thousands of items of evidence? It is hard to understand such dogged
adherence to this rationale. Consider a recent Connecticut case mentioned above,
State v. Booth."' The state supreme court majority was entirely dismissive of the
defense argument as to severance, with the judges firmly writing that "'the jury [is]
presumed to follow the court's directions in the absence of a clear indication to the
contrary." 30 5 Following the nationally accepted practice, that group ofjudges could
not find such "a clear indication to the contrary" despite the contention that the
instructions were exceedingly complex and confusing.30 6 This trial was troubling,
person prosecution. As Justice Stevens argued in dissent, the savings present in such a joint
case were not readily apparent. Id. at 218.
298 United States v. Salameh, 152 F.3d 88, 115 (2d Cir. 1998).
299 See supra text accompanying notes 228-35.
3® United States v. Marks, 209 F.3d 577, 585-85 (6th Cir. 2000); United States v.
Jackson, 180 F.3d 55, 75 (2d Cir. 1999); United States v. Mann, 161 F.3d 840, 862 (5th Cir.
1998); United States v. Casamento, 887 F.2d 1141, 1153 (2d Cir. 1989).
301 See supra text accompanying notes 202-07.
302 See, e.g., United States v. Hardin, 209 F.3d 652,664 (7th Cir. 2000), vacated on other
grounds sub nom. Sallis v. United States, 531 U.S. 1135 (2001); United States v. Eads, 191
F.3d 1206, 1209 (10th Cir. 1999); United States v. Mathison, 157 F.3d 541, 546 (8th Cir.
1998).
303 But see Moore v. Morton, 255 F.3d 95, 113 (3d Cir. 2001) (holding that a curative
instruction not sufficient in response to arguments of the prosecutor which were "irrelevant,
illogical and offensive").
304 737 A.2d 404 (Conn. 1999).
305 Id. at 418 (quoting State v. Griffin, 397 A.2d 89, 92 (Conn. 1978)) (alteration in
original).
" Booth, 737 A.2d at 418; cf id. at 440-41 (Berdon, J., dissenting).
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with evidence offered against a co-defendant for impeachment purposes only; on
at least one occasion the limiting instruction for that testimony was not given at the
time the evidence was offered, but rather after counsel for the co-defendants had
made their closing arguments." 7 In addition, the trial court revised the instructions
regarding certain testimony one week after the original limiting instruction had been
given." 8 Moreover, the instructions as given were hardly a model of clarity, leading
the dissenting judge to conclude that "these corrective instructions would bewilder
the mind of any juror, let alone a juror who has just sat through a long, complicated
trial that entailed continual limiting instructions."3 9 Still, in affirming the denial
of a severance request, the majority expressed confidence in the ability of thejurors
to follow such instructions." °
For a more realistic view of the limiting instruction, one should prefer to look
to Learned Hand and Jerome Frank. The former called the limiting instruction a
"recommendation to the jury of a mental gymnastic which is beyond, not only their
powers, but anybody[] else['s]."3 ' The latter asserted that the instruction "is a kind
of 'judicial lie': It undermines a moral relationship between the courts, the jurors,
and the public; like any other judicial deception, it damages the decent judicial
administration of justice."3 2
Where, then, does this discussion lead regarding remedies available for
problems created by the joinder of large numbers of defendants? Remedies do
unquestionably exist. The trial judge has the power to sever unwieldy
proceedings.3t3 With no showing that many trial judges actually are willing to
utilize that power, however, the remedy becomes meaningless in most such cases.
The option of the limiting instruction is even less appealing. While used in many
307 See id. at 440 (Berdon, J., dissenting); see also Imwinkelried, supra note 4, at 46
(discussing the timing for such instructions).
308 Booth, 737 A.2d at 440 (Berdon, J., dissenting).
309 Id. at 441 (Berdon, J., dissenting). Justice Berdon continued: "The confusion that these
instructions caused jurors who sat on the panel becomes readily apparent, when merely
reading the trial transcript of these corrective instructions boggles the mind of the reader."
Id.
310 See id. at 418.
31 Nash v. United States, 54 F.2d 1006, 1007 (2d Cir. 1932).
312 United States v. Grunewald, 233 F.2d 556, 574 (2d Cir. 1956) (Frank, J., dissenting),
rev'don other grounds, 353 U.S. 391 (1957). In EDMUNDM. MORGAN, SOMEPROBLEMS OF
PROOF UNDER THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF LITIGATION (1956) - quoted favorably
in Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 132 n.8 (1968) - the author wrote that the use of
limiting instructions shows an inconsistent attitude toward juries, by "treating them at times
as a group of low-grade morons and at other times as men endowed with a superhuman
ability to control their emotions and intellects." MORGAN, supra at 105; see also supra note
139 and accompanying text.
33 See, e.g., United States v. Price, 13 F.3d 711, 717 (1994).
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cases, it is, to quote Judge Hand again, "a placebo... a medicinal lie."3 4
v. Time to Correct the Problem
In reviewing multiple-defendant prosecutions and judicial decisions onjoinder
and severance, one ought to have little doubt that serious issues exist within the
system. These issues will remain so long as the Supreme Court of the United States
writes of a marked preference forjoint trials,315 and appeals courts view the review
of severance decisions as "extremely narrow,"3 6 concluding that severance rulings
"will rarely be disturbed on review.""3 7 To get a sense of the problem, one need
only look at several appellate opinions which expressly question the wisdom of
these large joint-defendant trials.
A good starting point is United States v. Casamento, the widely publicized
"Pizza Connection Case." 318 In that case, the jury returned guilty verdicts against
eighteen of twenty-one defendants after a trial of more than seventeen months.3 9
On appeal, the court discussed the serious disadvantages which can occur in "mega-
trials"32 and offered some solutions to the problems in such cases.32' There is also
United States v. Ellender,322 in which twenty-three defendants went to trial, and the
court noted that the result "demonstrate[d] the flaw in the government's apparent
assumption that 'bigger is better' in this type ofproceeding." '323 And, of course, one
should not ignore the appeal in United States v. Baker,324 resulting from "one of the
lengthiest and costliest trials in this nation's history," a sixteen-month proceeding
with thirty thousand pages of transcripts involving twelve defendants.325 The court
deliberated whether the prosecution unduly tested "the practical and human
limitations of our jury system itself. 326
314 Bruton, 391 U.S. at 132 n.8.
311 See also Justice White's strong language in Cruz v. New York, 481 U.S. 186 (1987),
discussing "the effect ofseverance on already overburdened state and federal court systems."
Id. at 198 (White, J., dissenting).
316 United States v. Mariscal, 939 F.2d 884, 886 (9th Cir. 1991).
311 United States v. Campanile, 518 F.2d 352, 359 (9th Cir. 1975).
318 887 F.2d 1141, 1147 (2d Cir. 1989). The origins (from an investigation in Sicily) of
this remarkable case are discussed in ALEXANDER STILES, EXCELLENT CADAVERS: THE
MAFIA AND THE DEATH OF THE FIRST ITALIAN REPUBLIC 124-29, 132-33, 211, 249 (1995).
319 Casamento, 887 F.2d at 1148.
320 Id. at 1151.
321 See infra text accompanying notes 332-37.
322 947 F.2d 748 (5thCir. 1991).
323 Id. at 751. Twenty-three defendants - less than one-sixth of whom were named -
were tried in this case, and at the end, "only a handful of defendants stood convicted." Id.
324 10 F.3d 1374 (9thCir. 1993).
325 Id. at 1386.
326 Id.
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All three of these cases involved incredibly large, complicated joint-defendant
trials.327 Each considered an appeal from a denial of a severance motion. 8 In each,
the court of appeals strongly chastised the government for the mess created by such
a prosecution,329 but ultimately upheld the severance denials by the trial judge.330
Is any further evidence needed as to the lack of a true remedy for inappropriate -
though technically correct - joinder? In short, if defendants cannot win on the
severance issues at trial or on appeal in spectacularly large and fitfully difficult
cases such as Baker, Ellender, and Casamento, it is fair to conclude that severance
is not going to be a terribly viable option in most joinder situations, even those in
"mega-trials."
It is not enough, then, to offer the uncritical view that judges retain sufficient
power to deal with these problems. Though the power may be present, the ability
and willingness to exercise that power in effective fashion can only be seen as
greatly constrained throughout the country at both the trial and appellate levels.
Strong remedies could be developed which would significantly improve the defense
situation with joint trials while not unduly burdening the government. It should be
emphasized at the outset, however, what is not being suggested. Let us return to the
earlier illustration involving the twenty defendants spread throughout the country
who could be joined together in a single trial in any one of twenty locations.'
Surely severance should be a realistic option here. Unfortunately, in all probability,
it is not. The Supreme Court in dismissive fashion misreads the arguments of its
critics when it writes that the choice on severance is either to retain our current
system, or to
impair both the efficiency and the fairness of the criminal justice system
[with] prosecutors [having to] bring separate proceedings, presenting the
same evidence again and again, requiring victims and witnesses to repeat
the inconvenience (and sometimes trauma) of testifying, and randomly
favoring the last-tried defendants who have the advantage of knowing
the prosecution's case beforehand.332
No one on the national scene is asserting a right to severance that would mandate
twenty trials of these twenty defendants requiring at least some witnesses to testify
twenty times. No criminal justice system in the United States has such a process,
327 Id. at 1386; United States v. Ellender, 947 F.2d 748, 751 (5th Cir. 1991); United States
v. Casamento, 887 F.2d 1141, 1148 (2d Cir. 1989).
32' Baker, 10 F.3d at 1386; Ellender, 947 F.2d at 753; Casamento, 887 F.2d at 1149.
329 Baker, 10 F.3d at 1390-91; Ellender, 947 F.2d at 754-55; Casamento, 887 F.2d at
1150-51.
330 Baker, 10 F.3d at 1393; Ellender, 947 F.2d at 752; Casamento, 887 F.2d at 1151.
331 See supra text accompanying notes 53-54.
332 Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 210 (1987).
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and for good reason, as it would be unduly restrictive for the prosecution in serious
cases involving far-flung criminal endeavors.
A middle ground can be found between our current system (virtually no
severance) and the Court's imagined horrible system (severance for all defendants
in almost all joint trials). Trial judges should be charged to weigh sensitively the
potential difficulties with large joint-defendant trials and to evaluate carefully the
need for - and impact of-. severance.333 It certainly has been done effectively on
occasion in the past and should be pursued far more vigorously in the future.3 To
achieve this end, the law ought to reverse wholly the current presumption in favor
of joint trials for defendants who have been indicted together.. In cases involving
many defendants, judges must be directed to question seriously the wisdom of the
six- to twelve-month trial involving a dozen or more individuals. If the government
can make a showing of great need coupled with little likely harm, perhaps its
joinder position will prevail. The trial judge should, however, presume that in a
major multiple-defendant prosecution, such need is not great and such harm will
occur; the burden would then be placed squarely on the prosecution to demonstrate
the contrary. While not the only key reform which could be pursued in large
cases,335 "[placing] the burden ofjustifying ajoint trial upon the party wishing it"'336
... In the Second Circuit, where ten defendants are joined together, the courts have been
told to determine the issue of potential prejudice with particular care. See United States v.
Casamento, 887 F.2d 1141, 1152 (2d Cir. 1989).
a3 See, e.g., United States v. Diaz, 176 F.3d 52, 75 (2d Cir. 1999) (severing and dividing
defendants into groups based upon breadth of charges); United States v. Thomas, 114 F.3d
228, 235 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (dividing twenty-four defendants into four groups for separate
trials); United States v. Andrews, 754 F. Supp. 1161, 1170 (N.D. Ill. 1990) (ordering
severance when the trial judge "weigh[ed] the public interest in ajoint trial of the twenty-two
to twenty-nine defendants against the possibility ofundue prejudice or confusion arising from
such a trial"). At the appellate level, see United States v. Pedrick, 181 F.3d 1264, 1273 (1 th
Cir. 1999).
33 One proposal is to have judges simply be more realistic in evaluating the risks involved
with a high profile matter, such as with the Oklahoma City bombing case, see supra note 279
and accompanying text, or with a case containing mutually exclusive defenses, as in United
States v. Mayfield, 189 F.3d 895 (9th Cir. 1999). This is theposition of the ABA Criminal
Justice section, discussed in Imwinkelried, supra note 4, at 54. Other proposals abound. First,
judges could conduct a more careful scrutiny ofjoinder on the basis of the length of the trial,
rather than the number of defendants. Casamento, 887 F.2d at 1152 (requiring prosecutors
to reasonably justify joinder in cases where "the prosecution's case will exceed four
months"); Fed. Bar Council Comm., supra note 4, at 140-41. Second, a limit could be
imposed on the permissible number of charges. Casamento, 887 F.2d at 1152. Third, judges
could consider severance mid-trial, after the situation becomes more clear. Pedrick, 181 F.3d
at 1274. But see Dawson, supra note 96, at 1411. Finally, the parties could conduct one trial
but use multiple juries for jointly tried defendants. Lambright v. Stewart, 191 F.3d 1181 (9th
Cir. 1999).
336 Dawson, supra note 96, at 1453.
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would go far to insure due process of jointly charged defendants.
To promote and enforce this new presumption, once again, the law ought to
require a change in the procedure offered. If the judge in a multiple-defendant case
rules on a severance motion, that judge should have to make these explicit findings:
(1) why joinder is or is not appropriate;
(2) why such a joint trial is or is not necessary; and
(3) whether steps apart from severance could be taken to insure that prejudice
to the defendants will not result.
And, to reinforce the validity of appellate review, changes again would be needed
so as to make such findings the basis for an interlocutory appeal by either party.3"
To do any less will not appreciably change our current, and rather dire, situation.
IV. CONCLUSION
Over the past fifty years the substantive law regarding joint criminal activities
has changed dramatically, with a decided shift in favor of the government. In both
legislatures and courts, old debates have been settled conclusively against
defendants' Nary a word is uttered today about the basis for the conclusion that
joint criminal danger is particularly great, that liability of one person for the crimes
of others should be very broad, or that RICO is an equitable criminal law principle.
The public, too, seemingly has spoken when it comes to the prosecution of joint
criminal ventures. Whether as to the penalties meted out or the resources utilized
to prosecute, few today challenge the direction in which our nation has moved.
It is important, though, to identify two quite distinct guiding principles. The
first is that, with a just system of criminal procedure in this area, we will prosecute
vigorously and impose wide liability and stiff penalties. The second, of equal
importance, is that we will not limit theprocess by which those suspected ofjoint
criminal actions are tried. The former is certainly well-established throughout the
country. Yet, in moving to the almost limitless rules currently governing venue and
joinder, we have virtually ignored the latter. Return, for a final time, to the
illustration utilized throughout this Article: the twenty defendants from twenty
cities accused of engaging in a nationwide conspiracy.338 Under our current venue
rules it is fairly certain that the prosecution could take place in any city - literally
any city - in which any act - truly any act - in furtherance of the plan, was
taken by any of the charged defendants. It is just as certain that the prosecution
could - in all but the most unusual of cases - insist that the twenty defendants be
joined-together for a single trial.
Such a result should be unacceptable. It is unfair for the defendants, it is
burdensome for the courts, and it may well be counterproductive for the
... As with venue decisions. See discussion supra Part III.A.
... See supra text accompanying notes 53-54.
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government. It is beyond the time to say that reforms must be taken in such cases
to insure an equitable fact finding process.339 Procedures must be put in place
which will reasonably accommodate both the government's interest in vigorously
prosecuting and the right of the defendant to contest massive trials held thousands
of miles from her home or from any activities she took part in, or even knew about.
Large joint proceedings with virtually unlimited prosecutorial power as to location
create tremendous difficulties for all concerned. It is essential that steps be taken
now to ensure due process of law even for those accused of participating in wide
ranging conspiracies. This thought of the Ninth Circuit's - in the appeal from an
astonishingly long, complex and difficult multiple-defendant trial - was written
now almost a decade ago: "[W]e hope that trials such as this remain exotic blooms
among legal flora and not rampant weeds threatening to strangle our most basic
ideals of a fair and efficient justice system. ' 340
One can only hope.
... Sixty years have passed since Circuit Judge Jerome Frank wrote of "[t]he need for
safeguarding defendants from misunderstanding by the jury[, which] is peculiarly acute in
conspiracy trials." United States v. Liss, 137 F.2d 995, 1003 (2d Cir. 1943) (Frank, J.,
dissenting). Justice Jackson's famous opinion in Krulewitch condemning such trials - cited
several times in this Article - was written more than fifty years ago. Krulewitch v. United
States, 336 U.S. 440, 445-58 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring).
340 United States v. Baker, 10 F.3d 1374, 1393 (9th Cir. 1993). And the thought certainly
continues, as stated in United States v. Gibbs, 182 F.3d 408 (6th Cir. 1999):
[E]vidence that the defendants knew each other, grew up together, sold crack in the
same area, or on occasion sold crack together fails to prove membership in the
conspiracy. Any other conclusion would permit the jury to infer membership in the
conspiracy by association of the defendants with one another. We must be careful,
especially in multi-defendant drug conspiracy trials, to guard against such findings
of guilt by association.
Id. at 423.
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